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Abstract
Little is known about how effectively federal agencies share terrorism intelligence with
state and local governments through fusion centers. As a result, there is a risk that local
governments do not receive critical intelligence that would allow them to collaboratively
prevent catastrophic terrorist attacks. Using Dawes’ interagency information sharing
model, the purpose of this exploratory case study was to evaluate how effectively federal
agencies share terrorism intelligence with fusion centers. Data were collected through
interviews with 25 senior leaders, federal agents deployed to fusion centers, and
intelligence analysts in 5 fusion centers on the East Coast. These data were inductively
coded and then subjected to a thematic analysis procedure. Findings indicated that,
among these leaders, information sharing was hindered by both technology and interorganizational relationships between the fusion centers and federal agencies. Participants
also noted that obstacles to information sharing regarding classified data has not been
sufficiently mitigated. Dawes’ interagency information-sharing theory was found to be
explanatory regarding intelligence sharing activities. Implications for positive social
change include recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security to utilize
Dawes’ work on information sharing in order to alleviate the tension between federal and
local agencies and remove obstacles, particularly related to classified intelligence related
to counterterrorism. Doing so can be useful in developing policy recommendations to
improve the dynamics between federal and local agencies, thereby allowing critical
information to be shared with state and local governments in a proactive manner that may
better protect communities.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Background
On September 11, 2001, the terrorist attacks on the United States (abbreviated
“9/11”) highlighted a number of gaps in the efforts of many different departments and
agencies charged with securing the nation, as well as a lack of effective interagency and
intergovernmental terrorism information-sharing. One of the many government reform
efforts that these attacks brought about in the United States was the collection of 22
different federal domestic security agencies into a new Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). The department was specifically tasked to prevent future terrorist attacks and to
better share information on terrorism threats (U.S. Congress, 2002, PL 107–296 § 201,
9). DHS was also charged with ensuring that state and local officials received information
from DHS as well as classified threat intelligence from other federal security agencies
(Bush, 2003).
DHS thus began supporting the establishment and growth of multi-agency
intelligence fusion centers owned and hosted by state and local officials around the
country. These fusion centers were intended to provide a framework for subfederal
agencies to be able to receive intelligence from federal agencies, and offer a mechanism
to collect reports from agencies within the jurisdiction itself (Lewandowski, Carter &
Campbell, 2017). The collective assemblage of DHS sponsored fusion centers owned by
state and local agencies has evolved into an unofficial national network.
However, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was not among the 22 federal
domestic security agencies incorporated into DHS; they retained and actually greatly
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amplified their preexisting role as the nation’s domestic counterterrorism agency
(Department of Justice, 2005; Treverton, 2008). In increasing their domestic
counterterrorism efforts, the FBI rapidly expanded its separate network of Joint Terrorism
Task Forces (JTTFs) around the country. This network has sometimes been in
competition with fusion centers in disseminating information and intelligence to state and
local officials (Cordner & Scarborough, 2010; Eack, 2008). The separate DHS and FBI
information-sharing mandates and mechanisms overlap in multiple areas, which has
created a bifurcated and ineffective dual track for federal counterterrorism informationsharing with subfederal security officials.
Problem Statement
Despite efforts by DHS and the FBI, a U.S. Government Accountability Office
report found that “effective mechanisms for sharing information—a best practice in
building successful information-sharing partnerships—had not been established”
(Larence, 2009, p. 23). This is not a new problem; many public policy scholars, such as
Dawes (1996), have found that “Despite the potential benefits, successful interagency
information-sharing is difficult to achieve” (p. 379). Even today domestic
counterterrorism interorganizational information-sharing remains suboptimal, as
demonstrated by recent undetected terrorist activities like the 2009 Fort Hood attack, the
attempted 2010 Times Square attack, the 2013 Boston marathon bombings and the March
2017 Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information (Mayer, Carafano, &
Zuckerman, 2011; Reilly, 2013; McCaul & Keating, 2014; U. S. Department of Justice,
2017).
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The 9/11 Commission Report stated that agencies needed to change the culture
from a “need to know” mindset to one of having a “duty to share” this terrorism threat
information that was acquired at taxpayer expense (Kean & Hamilton, 2004, p. 417). This
study explored how federal agencies are fulfilling their duty to share terrorism
information with state and local officials through the network of state and major urban
area fusion centers. However, the literature review showed there is very little empirical
research about this counterterrorism information-sharing and none that examined federal
agencies sharing their terrorism information and intelligence with fusion centers. Thus,
the problem is that the sharing of terrorist threat information and intelligence from federal
agencies to state and local fusion centers remains suboptimal. This hampers the
prevention of terrorism and presents vulnerabilities that have allowed catastrophes such
as the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 2013 Boston bombings to succeed (Barron, Lewis,
Silberstein, & Shapiro, 2016; Kean & Hamilton, 2004; Reilly, 2013; Zamora, 2014).
Purpose of Study
The purpose of this study was to examine the opportunities and obstacles of
sharing federal counterterrorism information with state and local officials. The research
identified the prospects and barriers that the State and Local Fusion Center (SLFC) model
provides for federal agency intelligence sharing with state and local partners about
terrorist threats. This study examined the subfederal SLFC model to assess its viability as
a framework for interorganizational domestic counterterrorism intelligence sharing from
federal agencies to state and local partners. The study identified some of the effective
sharing practices of SLFCs as well as the various impediments that prevent optimal
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intelligence sharing. This study has significant implications for social change.
Information-sharing is a critical function that the government should be fully leveraging
to improve homeland security and thus improve protection for citizens.
Research Outlook
Since a laboratory setting is not appropriate to study how these agencies interact,
a qualitative case study was used to reached practitioners on their own terms and to
examine a program or process in depth (Yin, 2009). The case study method allowed for
the study of a bounded issue, such as domestic counterterrorism information-sharing,
using multiple sites and multiple data sources (Maxwell, 2012).
This study was conducted as an exploratory qualitative case study. 25 officials at
five fusion centers on the East Coast of the United States were interviewed. The fusion
centers selected include a proportional mix of both state and regional major urban area
fusion centers. Major U.S. cities are high-value targets for terrorists because they have
significant population density and critical infrastructure. Conducting research at a major
city also offers the opportunity to include a critical case and exemplar, where “if it
doesn’t happen there, it won’t happen anywhere” (Patton, 2002, p. 236).
In order to gain access to the fusion centers and to enable participants to provide
their candid opinions, the fusion centers and the interviewees will remain anonymous.
Five individuals were interviewed at each site. Each participant was asked four main
questions and eight amplifying questions, the interviews averaged 30 minutes. This
qualitative research design with open-ended questions constituted a framework for
analyzing responses discovering trends and patterns.
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Conceptual Framework
This domestic interorganizational counterterrorism study was analyzed using
Dawes (1996) conceptual framework of interagency information-sharing to identify the
benefits and risks of intelligence sharing with nonfederal organizations. This study
applied this theoretical model to ascertain how officials and analysts from various
agencies represented within subfederal fusion centers view the opportunities of
information-sharing as well as the obstacles or costs to more effective sharing. While
other studies have looked at the benefits and risks of information-sharing, none have done
so in relation to federal counterterrorism intelligence with state and local officials (Carter,
Carter, Chermak & McGarrell, 2016; Drake, Steckler , & Koch, 2004; Bigdeli, Kamal, &
Cesare, 2013; Graphia, 2010; Landsbergen & Wolken, 2001; Lewandowski, Carter &
Campbell, 2017).
Research Questions
1. How effectively are fusion centers fulfilling their intended purpose of
improving homeland security by receiving terrorism information and
intelligence from federal agencies?
2. What are the opportunities in, or benefits of, federal counterterrorism
intelligence sharing with fusion centers?
3. What are the obstacles or barriers to federal counterterrorism intelligence
sharing with fusion centers?
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Limitation and Delimitations of Study
The study has multiple delimitations related to the sensitive nature of domestic
counterterrorism operations as well as ongoing intelligence and law enforcement
operations. While a number of information technology systems and architectures are
mentioned, this study is unclassified; it contains no information that is law enforcement
sensitive (LES) and does not discuss how terrorism information is shared. This study is
also limited to federal intelligence sharing with subfederal agencies and does not discuss
how information or intelligence is analyzed or used within the fusion centers, nor how it
is further disseminated.
Privacy and civil liberties have been a frequent issue with information and
intelligence sharing, and they are a particularly controversial topic with regard to state
and local fusion centers (German & Stanley, 2007; Hylton, 2009; Skahill, 2010).
However, these topics have already been the subject of numerous studies; many
government programs now exist to protect privacy and individual freedoms--along with
significant oversight programs to monitor their progress. While not minimizing these
very important topics, privacy and civil liberty issues were not addressed in this study.
Definition of Key Terms
Data, Information, and Intelligence
With government information-sharing, the terms data, information, and
intelligence are often used interchangeably (Palmieri, 2005). But this is incorrect. There
are significant differences between all three terms; having access to data from a federal
agency is very different from sharing actionable intelligence (Treverton, 2008;

7
Department of Justice, 2006). Government agencies collect volumes of data from various
and multiple sources, but much of it is not in a useful from. However, when that data is
processed—for example, when documents or wire taps are translated from a foreign
language—it is converted into information. However, this information is considered raw
and it may or may not be useful in the context of homeland security. To make the
information useful, a variety of other sources of information often need to be considered
and analysis is needed to turn the information into intelligence. See Figure 1 for a
depiction of these relationships.

Figure 1. Data, information and intelligence. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013, p. I-2).
The definition of intelligence provided by Carter (2009) to the Department of
Justice for use by state and local law enforcement agencies states that intelligence means
“Analysis of raw information to provide synergistic knowledge about a threat” (p. 10).
This definition emphasizes intelligence as both a process and a product. Other aspects of
intelligence are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. For the purposes of this research,
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intelligence means to convey sensitive information about threats (Tromblay, 2016). At
times such intelligence will be fragmentary, such as a single report of suspicious activity
by a particular individual, or it may be more refined, such as detailed analysis of terrorist
attack trends or bomb-making techniques. Additionally, in the context of federal sharing
with nonfederal fusion centers, there is an expectation that the intelligence these federal
agencies share is always sensitive and often classified, so that recipients must have
appropriate security clearances and secure means to receive it.
Terrorism
The United States Congress defines terrorism in law under Title 22 as a crime that
is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets
by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (U.S. Congress, 2012, 22 U.S. Code
Chapter 38 § 2656fd). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) gets more specific and
defines terrorism as “the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group
or individual…to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives” (FBI, 2005, p. v). For the
purpose of this research, this study used a hybrid definition for terrorism—the planned,
threatened or use of illegitimate violence primarily against innocent people to achieve the
psychological effect of fear or for political or other ideological purposes (Bruce, 2013, p.
27).
State and Local
There are many different descriptions for the subfederal levels of government. For
the purpose of this research any major jurisdiction directly below the federal level such as
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state, commonwealth or federal territory will be considered a state for definitional
purposes. Any substate or jurisdiction smaller than a state such as a city, county, or tribal
territory will be termed the local level. The terms city or major urban area are used
interchangeably with the term local in this research.
Significance of Study
This study contributes to the body of knowledge by exploring the current state of
intergovernmental terrorist threat information-sharing between federal agencies and state
and local fusion centers. The 2012 National Strategy for Information-sharing and
Safeguarding stated that connecting related information from different agencies “can
mean the difference between identifying a threat during the planning stage or analyzing
what could have been done to thwart the attack after it occurs” (National Security
Council, 2012, p. 10). This study is significant as effective sharing of federal terrorism
intelligence with state and local officials may have prevented terrorist attacks such as
those on September 11th 2001, the 2009 Fort Hood Shooting, as well as the 2013 Boston
Marathon Bombings (Reilly, 2013). By identifying the opportunities and obstacles to
effective terrorism intelligence sharing this study advances the body of knowledge to
better protect citizens.
Very little research into counterterrorism information-sharing exists, and no
empirical research has studied the effectiveness of federal intelligence sharing with state
and local officials. The topics of information-sharing and fusion centers have mainly
been examined only in the briefest manner. Most studies into fusion centers examined
dissemination and only down sharing to customers like state troopers (Ratcliffe &
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Walden, 2010). Also, a fusion center study in 2016 stated, “Few scholars have gained
access to fusion centers and begun to examine the intelligence process within these
organizations” (Carter, Carter, Chermak & McGarrell, 2016, p.2).
Intelligence sharing with state and local officials is especially important to
counter terrorism in this era of internet radicalization and the proliferation of the means to
commit terrorist acts. As Larence (2011) stated that, “The federal government recognizes
that fusion centers represent a critical source of local information about potential threats,
including homegrown terrorism, and a means to disseminate terrorism-related
information and intelligence from federal sources” (p. 10). This present study is
significant because it reveals the barriers to effective counterterrorism informationsharing; if the barriers are mitigated, it would help to prevent future attacks and likely
save lives.
Summary
Terrorists and their violent attacks on innocent Americans are a threat that will
likely never go away (Treverton, 2008, p. 107). Thus, government agencies must
continue to improve homeland security efforts and interorganizational cooperation among
the agencies. This exploratory case study of fusion centers on the East Coast offered new
knowledge about the effectiveness of sharing federal terrorism threat information with
state and local officials. This is a unique area of research and is expected to identify the
obstacles that prevent optimal sharing with nonfederal fusion centers. This examination
of the critical issue of information and intelligence sharing between federal agencies and
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subfederal fusions center offers an opportunity to significantly improve how citizens are
protected in the United States.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
This research addressed counterterrorism intelligence and information-sharing
between federal agencies and subfederal state and local officials. Sharing terrorist threat
information and intelligence from federal agencies with state and local fusion centers
remains suboptimal; this hampers the prevention of terrorism and presents opportunities
for terrorists as was seen on 9/11 and the more recent Boston Marathon bombings. The
purpose of this research was to study the ability of fusion centers to serve as the focal
point for federal counterterrorism information and intelligence sharing. In this chapter I
reviewed the literature by looking at the role and function of intelligence, the
information-sharing lapses that enabled the 9/11 attacks to succeed, terrorism threats and
counterterrorism, and domestic security and the role of state and local agencies in
homeland security. The chapter also addresses the literature on nonfederal fusion centers,
domestic intelligence and information-sharing, as well as recent domestic
counterterrorism failures. Most importantly, this section describes the empirical research
in the field of domestic counterterrorism information-sharing and sets up the study to
examine federal agencies’ sharing of terrorism information and intelligence with fusion
centers.
Literature Search Strategy
This literature review examined the research across numerous significant topics
and fields relevant to the study: (a) intelligence for homeland security; (b) informationsharing failures related to the 9/11 terrorist attacks; (c) terrorist threats and domestic
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counterterrorism; (d) domestic security and the role of state and local agencies; (e)
history of nonfederal fusion centers; (f) domestic intelligence and information-sharing;
(g) recent domestic counterterrorism information failures.
The review included aspects of the theoretical framework of interagency
information-sharing. The theoretical model of interagency information-sharing analyzed
the benefits and risks when agency officials are considering sharing information with
other organizations. Finally, this literature review explored the existing research into
fusion centers as it relates to effective interagency information-sharing from federal
intelligence and law enforcement agencies.
The data were placed into categories to examine the role and function of
intelligence, the information-sharing lapses that enabled the 9/11 attacks to succeed,
terrorism threats and counterterrorism, and domestic security and the role of state and
local agencies in homeland security. In this study, the following databases were used:
Google Scholar, Academic Search Complete, International Security & Counter Terrorism
Reference Center, Homeland Security Digital Library, Military and Government
Collection, ProQuest Central and ProQuest Dissertations, Political Science Collection,
Taylor Francis Online, Sage Publications, and JSTOR.
Since this research is in the field of public policy and administration, publications
from government agencies were particularly important; they were gathered from the
public websites of the following agencies: Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
Department of Justice (DoJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), as well as the Library of Congress. The
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reference lists and bibliographies of the studies I read and were further examined for
additional sources. This harvesting continued until the relevance of the topics went
beyond the scope of this study.
Examination of the literature was conducted using various the following search
terms: information-sharing, intelligence sharing, interagency information-sharing,
interagency collaboration, 9/11 failures, domestic intelligence, law enforcement
intelligence, fusion center, interagency communication, interorganizational
communication, homeland security, domestic security, homeland security informationsharing, DHS information-sharing, FBI information-sharing, homeland security failures,
terrorist threats, and domestic counterterrorism failures.
Roles and Functions of Intelligence
Gaining knowledge about ones adversaries has been an essential function of rulers
since biblical times. The United States first employed intelligence at home and abroad
during the Revolutionary War, and this has continued to be an important government
function to protect national interests and defend citizens from threats (Keegan, 2003).
However, the use of the term intelligence by governments has multiple meanings. Carter
(2004) described intelligence as primarily a product:
In the purest sense, intelligence is the end product of an analytic process that
evaluates information collected from diverse sources; integrates the relevant
information into a logical package; and produces a conclusion, estimate, or
forecast…using the scientific approach to problem solving (that is, analysis).
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Intelligence, therefore, is a synergistic product intended to provide meaningful
and trustworthy actionable knowledge to…decision makers (p. 9).
While intelligence certainly is an intelligence product resulting from analysis, it is
also a process—the intelligence cycle--and some use the term intelligence to mean
intelligence organizations such as the agencies of the Intelligence Community overall
(Carter, 2004, pp. 9-10; Bimfort, 1995, para. 9). While intelligence can be a process,
product, or an agency, when it comes to the context of homeland security, intelligence
plays a very important role. This highlights the point that “Information is only as valuable
as our capacity to process, integrate, and interpret it” (Davis & Kayyem, 2014, para. 7).
Intelligence to protect the nation from threats includes a broad range of
requirements that address both external foreign adversaries as well as domestic
challenges such as homegrown extremism, which are predominantly a law enforcement
concern. As Wheaton and Beerbower (2006) describe:
If intelligence, as a concept, is to mean anything at all, it should be large enough
to contain not only the national security community but also the intelligence
communities within business and law enforcement. Failure to establish such a
comprehensive definition damages - perhaps fatally - the notion of intelligence
itself (p. 327).
As described in Chapter 1, there are significant differences between the meaning
of information and intelligence. This is also important in understanding the role of
intelligence. As Palmieri (2005) states,
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The first problem that confusing the terms “information” and “intelligence”
caused was that many agencies employed so-called analysts who were either
unaware of or untrained in analysis and who were merely collecting and
disseminating raw data. In some agencies, the ability to search databases was
considered sufficient for analysts in law enforcement; this was strictly a law
enforcement interpretation of the position. (para. 6)
The Intelligence Cycle
The process of collecting information, analyzing it, and disseminating the
resulting product it referred to as the intelligence process or intelligence cycle. Palmieri
(2005) succinctly described this intelligence process stating, “The steps of the
intelligence cycle include planning, collection, evaluation, collation and organization,
analysis, production, dissemination, and feedback, which should spur more collection, at
which point the cycle begins again” (para. 5). As Carter (2009) has written “This process
provides mechanisms to ensure the consistent management of information that will be
used to create intelligence” (p. 57). The intelligence cycle starts with identifying
intelligence gaps or requirements and the whole point of the process is to ultimately
deliver or disseminate intelligence products to decision makers in a timely manner (Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 2013, p. I-5).
The intelligence process steps of collation and processing of data are important
and often involve technical means or even the translation of what was collected into a
useable format. Data are essentially raw information such as a list of unassociated phone
numbers, which is of little value without being put in context. When these raw data are
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processed, such as associating the phone numbers with the names of their owners, they
then become information. When this information about the phone numbers and their
owners is combined with other information such as the call locations and frequency of
calls, analysis can be done to assess likely associations between these individuals and
predict who the leader may be. This resulting product of analysis provides context and an
assessment or prediction is only then is considered intelligence. Intelligence analytical
products often factor in historical trends and employ multiple sources of information
collected by various means. This intelligence process applies to all levels of government
including national level strategic intelligence focused on foreign threats.
National and Foreign Intelligence
Intelligence related to adversaries overseas or the threats that enemy nations and
other actors pose to the United States is generally considered national level intelligence
as well as foreign intelligence. While the purpose of intelligence clearly serves the nation,
there are many customers of intelligence efforts, and intelligence is often put into
different categories based on the specialized needs of these different users of intelligence.
For example, the President of the United States and his National Security Council use
intelligence for decision making, but so do police officers protecting the streets of any
major city. Some of the most commonly referred to customers of intelligence are at this
national level in Washington, DC. The post-9/11 Intelligence reform law defined this
category of national level intelligence for the purposes of national security in the U.S.
Code:
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National Intelligence and the term ‘intelligence related to national security’ refer
to all intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and including
information gathered within or outside the United States, that…involves threats to
the United States, its people, property, or interests; the development, proliferation,
or use of weapons of mass destruction; or any other matter bearing on United
States national or homeland security. (U.S. Congress, 2004, IRTPA Section 1012,
Public Law 108-458)
It is also common, at least in the military, to categorize intelligence based upon
the three recognized levels of war that includes strategic, operational, and tactical.
Strategic intelligence is generally collected by national level intelligence agencies, or
provided to very senior civilian or military officials at the national level. The definition of
strategic intelligence by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (2013) in the joint publication 2-0
on Joint Intelligence states:
National strategic intelligence is produced for the President, the National Security
Council…and other U.S. Government departments and agencies. It is used to
develop national strategy and policy, monitor the international and global
situation, prepare military plans, determine major weapon systems and force
structure requirements, and conduct strategic operations. (p. I-23)
While these military focused definitions are useful and important to understand,
they do not directly translate for use in the homeland where monikers such as ‘strategic’
have very different meanings at the state and local levels. According to Canas (2012),
strategic intelligence is that which is simply used to make predictions about the future,
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even at the local levels, and he states “if the analysis predicts an emerging trend or
pattern it is strategic intelligence” (p. 40). This leads to addressing the types of
intelligence used for more tactical levels and they information needed to drive preemptive
actions against terrorists.
Operational, Tactical, and Actionable Intelligence
In the U.S. military, operational and tactical intelligence supports the
corresponding military commands at those levels. An example of operational level
intelligence consists of supporting a senior military force commander responsible for
overseeing an entire military campaign, like all joint operations in Afghanistan or against
the Islamic State in Syrian and Iraq. An example of tactical intelligence would be the
collection and analysis to support a small unit commander about to conduct an attack on a
hill or an enemy entrenched in a city. Tactical intelligence is also a term that has meaning
to law enforcement as well. One example of tactical intelligence in a domestic context
would be using a small drone to check the roof of a bank before a SWAT teams ascends
to the roof to assault from the top down onto robbers who have taken hostages inside the
building.
Actionable intelligence, as the name suggests, consists of detailed and timely
intelligence reports that are specific enough to allow an agency to take action to prevent a
crime or other event. In fact, the lack of actionable intelligence is the excuse most
commonly heard to explain why the U.S. government did not go after al Qaeda long
before 9/11 even though the terrorist group declared war against us and we knew where
they were. The case of not attacking al Qaeda overseas before 9/11 due to lacking
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actionable intelligence was outlined in the article by Shultz (2004) which described one
main reason for not going was the lack of detailed intelligence on Osama Bin Laden’s
specific location for more than a brief moment in time, as well as the number of civilians
in his vicinity (section 9, No Actionable Intelligence).
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are relevant and significant differences between
the terms information and intelligence as and having access to agency data is very
different from sharing actionable intelligence (Palmieri, 2005, para. 6.). It is useful for the
purposes of this study to look at exactly what is meant by actionable intelligence when it
comes to terrorism. The U.S. military manual on counterterrorism describes five key
elements of actionable intelligence as it relates to an HVI or high value individual as
follows:
1. Location. Providing an ellipse radius or “vicinity of” location, if possible. Even
a probable location is worthwhile.
2. Facilities. Providing useful data that can help identify the place when an HVI is
involved, or where terrorist assets are located.
3. Time. Providing the time of a sighting or an event. Time, as with location,
helps to establish patterns that are exploitable. Time is also useful in
establishing potential evidence that may link an HVI to actual or planned
terrorist events.
4. Travel. Providing information regarding movement and means of travel and
other available details when they relate to HVIs.

21
5. Relationships/connections. Providing known or suspected family/tribal
relationships that exhibit or have potential for greater trust…show possible
linkages from COG (Center of Gravity)/critical capabilities to critical
vulnerabilities. (JP 3-26, 2009, p.V-5)
Actionable intelligence is a term that does translate well across all levels of
government and multiple agencies. This type of intelligence is a key aspect of this study
as this is exactly the type of intelligence that is needed at the state and local level to
address specific terrorism threats to provide for the ability to identify, prevent, interdict,
or disrupt terrorist attacks. Actionable intelligence in a terrorism context brings the study
back to look at the need for this type of information to be used in a domestic context.
Domestic Intelligence and Homeland Security Information/Intelligence
Domestic intelligence of course is focused on internal threats within the country.
However, domestic intelligence is more complicated than that. A useful description for
domestic intelligence includes the following excerpt from a book titled Remaking
Domestic Intelligence by former Federal Judge Richard Posner (2011) who stated it is,
intelligence concerning threats of major, politically motivated violence, or of
equally grievous harm to national security, mounted within the nation's territorial
limits, whether by international terrorists, homegrown terrorists, or spies or
saboteurs employed by foreign nations. (p. 1)
While the intelligence process to produce intelligence for domestic users is
similar to that of national strategic intelligence, there are also some significant

22
differences as well. A study by the RAND Corporation into domestic intelligence for
counter terrorist described domestic intelligence as that which,
involves investigation of tips and other information about suspicious behavior to
uncover who is involved and for what purpose. However, while law enforcement
is focused on specific cases, domestic intelligence also includes exploratory
activities designed to produce new leads and tips and to serve a broader warning
function by building a strategic understanding of the domestic threat environment.
(Leuschner, 2008, p.1)
During the Cold War with the global struggle against the Soviet Union and the
threat of domestic Communists at home, intelligence and law enforcement agencies
worked to counter these threats. However, there were few laws or regulations to govern
these domestic security and surveillance activities and it resulted intelligence collection
targeted against innocent Americans during this period. Numerous investigations later
determined that intelligence and law enforcement agencies violated the privacy and
constitutional rights of many citizens during this era (U.S. Senate, 1976, Church
Committee Reports, Book II). When these violations became public, many laws and
executive orders were then written in the 1970s to prevent more abuses as well as to
specifically separate intelligence activities from law enforcement work (Best, 2007, pp.
2-3). Domestic intelligence implied a very negative meaning because of this earlier dark
era.
A game changer for domestic intelligence and law enforcement came on 9/11.
Judge Posner (2011) described how the FBI “turned in the most lackluster performance
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of any agency in the run-up to 9/11, even though it had (and has) the primarily
responsibility among police and intelligence services for preventing terrorists attacks on
the nation from within” (p. 11). The 9/11 terrorist attacks were such an immediate and
seminal event that views seemed to change overnight on the subject of domestic
intelligence, and this turn-around is best evidenced by the passage of the USA PATRIOT
ACT just days after the attack (Lerner, 2003). Rascoff (2010) described this resulting
growth of domestic intelligence very aptly stating,
In the wake of 9/11, new government agencies with domestic intelligence
responsibilities have been created, and others have been substantially retooled to
focus on intelligence. State and local governments have also become heavily
involved in domestic intelligence activities, either collaboratively with the federal
government or independently. (p. 580)
The 9/11 was widely viewed as a “a failure of domestic intelligence, having been
mounted from within the United States by terrorists who had been in this country for
months--some intermittently for years” (Posner, 2011, p. 1). As a result of these attacks
we also had the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, as well as the
acceptance of the term Homeland Security Intelligence or HSI for some. While that term
may not be accepted by all, the term “Homeland Security Information” is established in
U.S. law and is defined as basically any information possessed by a federal, state, or local
agency that related to the threat of or response to terrorist activity (6 USC 482(f)(1)
2006). The law goes on to describe homeland security information as that which is
related to the ability to prevent, interdict, or disrupt terrorist attacks, which now brings

24
the study to the topic of how the U.S. failed to stop the 9/11 hijackers when it possessed
information that may have prevented the attack.
The September 2001 al Qaeda Terrorist Attacks and Information-sharing Failures
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States—also
known as the 9-11 Commission – famously described the government failures that
allowed 19 al Qaeda operatives to enter the country and hijack four civilian airlines and
commit the deadliest terrorist attack in history. Much of these failures were on the part of
large federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies. This section examines these
federal failures as well as the implications for subfederal state and local agencies.
Internal Federal Agency Information-Sharing Failures
One of the government lapses that allowed the 9/11 attackers to enter the United
States and travel around unmolested was the failure of federal intelligence and law
enforcement agencies to share information with each other, the main thesis of the 9/11
Commission Report (Kean & Hamilton, 2004). One of the most famous lapses was the
CIA not informing the FBI during the summer of 2001 about known al Qaeda terrorists
not only possessing valid U.S. entrance visas, but actually being present in the United
States at the time and, “none of the 50 to 60 CIA officials who could and should have
watch-listed two of the 9/11 hijackers did so” (Zegart, 2008, para. 2). The 9/11
Commission Report stated these “fault lines in our government—between foreign
intelligence and domestic intelligence” significantly contributed to the government’s
inability to “connect the dots” and see the 9/11 attacks coming (Kean & Hamilton, 2004,
p. xvii).
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The failures leading to that attack were more than just not connecting dots. As
Palmieri (2005) states, “the information to prevent the September 11, 2001, attacks was
available, collected by someone, and stored somewhere; what was missing was the
analysis that would have made all this information useful to decision makers” (para. 6).
However accurate this statement may be, it assumes that this information was shared or at
least available to analysts for them to examine and make an assessment, but it was not
(Sims, 2007). The main reason information was not shared among federal agencies about
al Qaeda and the hijackers being within in the country had to do with the divisions
between agencies responsible for law enforcement and those who primarily collect and
analyze intelligence.
The 9/11 Commissioners examined closely the so called ‘wall’ between law
enforcement and intelligence which had resulted from a “widespread perception that
statuary barriers restricted the flow of information” between intelligence and law
enforcement agencies (Best, 2010, p. 14). This divide between these two government
functions partly arose due to abuses by federal agencies during the Cold War, but also
because of an attempt to keep the information from foreign intelligence and law
enforcement separate. As Erwin (2013) wrote in a report for Congress on intelligence,
“These barriers derived from the different uses of information collected by the two sets of
agencies—foreign intelligence used for policymaking and military operations and law
enforcement information to be used in judicial proceedings in the United States” (p. 17).
One of the key recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report was to remove
this ‘wall’ between intelligence and law enforcement that prevented the proper sharing of
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information between agencies and contributed to the success of the nineteen suicide
operatives on that day in 2001 (Kean and Hamilton, 2004, pp. 78-79). Congress did
remove many limits on the sharing intelligence and law enforcement information with the
USA PARTIOT Act of 2001, but “long-established practices have not been completely
overcome” (Best, 2010, p. 7). However, we should ask ourselves what might have been
the case is this information where shared within federal agencies as well as across the
Nation with state and local officials.
Subfederal Information-sharing Failures
While the FBI did not know that al Qaeda terrorists were in the United States in
the summer of 2001, a number of subfederal enforcement agencies had multiple
interactions with the 9/11 hijackers. In fact three of the al Qaeda terrorists received
speeding tickets, and two of those were in violation of their immigration status and the
third had an arrest warrant out for failure to pay an earlier ticket (Bjelopera, 2011; Kean
& Hamilton, 2004). When former White House Counterterrorism “Czar” Richard Clarke
(2004) testified publicly to the 9/11 Commission that if he had been told in the summer of
2001 that some of these al Qaeda terrorists were in the U.S. he would have,
had the FBI release a press release with their names, with their descriptions, held
a press conference, tried to get their names and pictures on the front page of every
paper—America's Most Wanted, the evening news—and caused a successful
nationwide manhunt for those two, two of the 19 hijackers. (p.110)
Even though no one was looking for the terrorists within the United States,
multiple state and local police had interactions with the 9/11 terrorists, which could have
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been significant had they been informed of the threat they posed. As Kobach (2004)
stated,
One of the most disturbing aspects of the story of the September 11 terrorists is
the fact that three of the hijackers were accosted by local police in routine law
enforcement encounters. Had the federal government possessed information
regarding their possible terrorist connections, and had that information been
distributed to police officers…the terrorist plot might have been derailed. (p. 6)
It is appropriate to call these law enforcement encounters a failure to share and
contributing factors to the 9/11 tragedy, especially since they were travelling under their
true names. If Richard Clarke or the FBI had been told by the CIA about these terrorists
being in the country, and had they taken the actions described, these might not have been
routine traffic stops (Alexander & Mors, 2007). This is what the government must strive
for and it leads the literature review to what terrorism threats there are to the homeland
and how domestic counterterrorism is addressed.
Terrorism Threats and Counterterrorism
In Chapter 1, a hybrid definition for terrorism was outlined as the planned or use
of illegitimate violence primarily against innocent people to achieve the psychological
effect of fear or for political or other ideological purpose (Bruce, 2013). Unfortunately,
terrorism has not subsided since 2001, but it has actually expanded and evolved. This
section addresses threats to the homeland as well as counterterrorism within the nation.
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Terrorism Threats to the Homeland
The terrorist threats to the U.S. from al Qaeda and similar overseas terrorist
groups has remained high since 2001. Al Qaeda continually endeavored to attack the U.S.
in number of ways, including multiple attempts on airliners using bombs planted in
shoes, printer cartridges, and even explosive underwear (Biello, 2011). The United States
and other nations aggressively attacked al Qaeda in Afghanistan and other places, but the
threat did not dissolve. In 2009 al Qaeda also directly attempted to bomb the New York
City subway system (Filler, 2010). While this type of international terrorism has been a
concern since the 1970s, a more recent and troubling development has been the
expansion of homegrown terrorism (Nelson & Bodurian, 2010). The terrorist threat
evolved to include this domestic component where those residing in America became
radicalized at home and have conducts attacks inspired by al Qaeda and other groups
(Barron, Lewis, Silberstein, and Shapiro, 2016). One of the 9/11 Commission Co-Chairs,
Lee Hamilton, described this type of threat by stating,
Al-Qaeda is much more diffuse than it was. There are pockets of strength of AlQaeda. So I think it remains a threat that is a serious one to the country…The
threat that concerns us now in many ways is the home-grown terrorist, the
American citizen if you would, who turns radical and subject to extremist
ideology. This is the so-called lone wolf threat, and in many ways it’s harder to
detect than a more elaborate attack. (Alspaugh, 2011, para. 24)
These types of domestic attacks by radicalized U.S. resident greatly increased
starting in 2009-2010 where “there were a dozen jihadist inspired homegrown terrorist
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attacks and attempts by American citizens or legal immigrants (two attacks and 10 plots),
which is a significant increase from the average of two attempts and no attacks the in
seven previous years since 9/11” (Randol, 2010, p. 56). Domestic radicalization was
previously seen as an issue mainly for Europe, but these attacks here at home caused
many to recognize it is, “a bigger threat in the United States than originally believed”
(Randol, 2010, p. 56).
A 2014 study by Hewitt outlining a chronology of terrorist plots and attacks since
9/11, “reveals…all were carried out by lone wolves or a group of friends…Most plots
were by Islamist extremists (53%)…” (p. 66). Some of these attacks involved shootings
as seen at Fort Hood in 2009, while others were bombings and attempted bombings like
in New York’s Times Square in 2009 as well as the Boston Marathon in 2013. The New
York City subway attempted attack was by core al Qaeda, while the Times Square
attempt was by an al Qaeda affiliate, while Fort Hood and Boston were al Qaeda inspired
lone wolf attacks. This means that “the threat is three-fold: from al-Qaeda ‘Core’; alQaeda's regional affiliates and allies; and homegrown extremists” (Silber & Frey, 2013,
p. 129).
More recently are the developments of the former al Qaeda in Iraq branch, which
has established itself as the self-proclaimed “Islamic State” and has seized significant
territory in both Iraq and Syria and is often called the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or
ISIS (Laub, 2015). In 2015 this group greatly expanded terrorist attacks beyond the
Middle East and directly struck out at Western targets such as a complex attack in Paris
France by multiple small teams of shooters and suicide bombers who killed 130 and
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wounded about 200 more in one night (Laub, 2015). This group also has brought online
propaganda and recruiting to a new level and has inspired many homegrown attacks all
over the world, to include a number here in the United States. The House Homeland
Security Committee reported in January 2016 that the previous year had the highest
terrorist threat level since 9/11, including the ISIS inspired attack in San Bernardino
California that killed 14 in a single homegrown terrorist attack (House Homeland, 2016).
While homegrown terrorism has increased, we also cannot discount the most
significant threat is the nexus between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs), as the acquisition and potential use of these weapons has long been a stated
goal of terrorist organizations like al Qaeda (Graham & Talent, 2008). While this is
clearly not the most likely threat, the potential catastrophic results from a WMD attack
require significant vigilance and collaborative counterterrorism efforts. The next section
examines how terrorism is countered in the United States.
Countering Terrorism in the United States
As previously mentioned in this chapter, domestic Counterterrorism (CT) is
primarily the role of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (U.S. Code Title 28, 2009, Sec
.85). The FBI is the lead agency within the U.S. to investigate terrorism and disrupt any
plots it may discover (Silber & Frey, 2013). However, countering these various terrorism
threats within the United States is not something the FBI can do alone, so these efforts
requires multiple agencies of the federal government, like national intelligence agencies,
as well as close collaboration with state and local officials who are essentially the eyes
and ears in communities (Ernst, 2014).
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While terrorism is just a violent tactic employed for political or other purposes, it
cannot be entirely eliminated any more than illegal narcotics can be eradicated. However,
there are measures that can be employed to reduce radicalization and disrupt terror plots
in the making (Rineheart, 2010). Domestic CT entails an all-inclusive approach and
consists of measures to: counter radicalization, track suspected terrorists, deny them entry
into the country, as well as efforts to deter, prevent, identify, pre-empt, and disrupt
terrorist attacks using the full capabilities and resources of federal, state, local and tribal
entities (White House, 2011).
As former Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano (2011) has stated,
The realities of today’s threat environment also means that State and local law
enforcement officers will more often be in the first position to notice the signs of
a planned attack. So our focus must be on aiding law enforcement and helping to
provide them with the information and resources they need to secure their own
communities from the threats they face. (p. 7)
According to statute and executive orders the FBI retains the leading role in
domestic CT, and their capabilities have grown significantly since 9/11 with the bureau
reprioritizing, refocusing and reorganizing to address this threat (Hoffman, Meese &
Roemer, 2015). While many agencies and actors have a role in conducting or supporting
domestic CT, striving for what the military called unity of effort requires,
coordination not only at the apex of the federal government but also at the
operational/tactical level, where response and intervention actions may be taken
by diverse authorities acting independently or in coordination with each other.
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This policy requires what is doctrinally known as unified action, also called the
‘whole of government approach’ by many interagency partners. (JP 3-26 CT,
2011, p. I-4)
However, this interagency approach with diverse and overlapping responsibilities,
authorities, and jurisdictions has proved to be a significant obstacle to effective domestic
CT, and the President even outlined this in the U.S. National Strategy for
Counterterrorism stating that “Integrating and harmonizing the efforts of federal, state,
local and tribal entities remains a challenge” (White House, 2011, p. 11). Although many
in the public and private sector recognize the grave threat that terrorism poses to this
Nation, cohesive counterterrorism remains elusive even 15 years after 9/11 (Vicinanzo,
2015).
Domestic Security and the Role of State and Local Agencies
Domestic security within the United States Federal Republic is a complex and
shared responsibility that spans all levels of government. The U.S. Constitution clearly
outlines that some governmental roles are solely a national matter such as foreign policy
and national defense. However, the 10th Amendment to the Constitution basically
reserves all other powers not specified as national level for state governments to deal with
at their level (Wright, 1990). For protection of citizens and preservation of life, the
federal form of government in the United States primarily relies on local officials and
first responders to provide this domestic security as a first resort (McCreight, 2015).
Within the federal government alone there are approximately 40 U.S. government
executive branch departments and agencies with a domestic security or response role, and
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these agencies are not coordinated with each other nor are they adequately postured to
collectively support officials at the state and local level (Wise & Nader, 2002, p. 45).
Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations for Domestic Security
The concept of federalism is about a power sharing arrangements between the
national government and the respective state governments. Young (2015) writes that,
The original constitutional strategy for limiting national power and protecting
state autonomy was the doctrine of enumerated powers. Article I, Section 8 lists
explicitly confers certain powers on Congress; the Tenth Amendment then makes
clear that the enumerated powers are it; whatever powers the Constitution doesn’t
confer remain with the States. (p. 8)
These enumerated and reserved powers provide for a very complicated domestic
security environment in this Constitutional federated republic. The U.S. government can
be looked at as a multifaceted “intergovernmental system” of three tiers that consist of
federal, state, and local levels, and each level has some functions that overlap in
numerous areas of domestic security (Mushkatel & Weschler, 1985, p. 49). Domestic
security issues evolved during the two world wars and the Cold War, and now the threat
of terrorism from abroad after 9/11 brought even more changes. In the new modern era of
super-empowered non-state actors such as terrorist groups, “This federal-centric
homeland security system we have right now is a single point of failure” (Morton, 2012,
p. i).
The importance of state and local governments in internal security matters can be
traced to the early days of this nation, and the “Constitution leaves with states, and the
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states delegate to local governments, many of the broad police powers which naturally
come into play” (Warmsley and Schroeder, 1996, p. 242). While it is common practice
that investigations and crises are managed at the lowest level possible, Wise (2006) noted
that when state and local governments are overwhelmed, governors may request federal
assistance. Ultimately domestic security is a collaborative effort among all three levels of
government as, “no single actor enjoys sufficient authority or resources to compel action”
(Chenoweth & Clarke, 2010, p. 498).
In 2006, Eisinger described the challenges of effective domestic counterterrorism
by writing “The terror attacks of 9/11 exposed a federal system that was ill-prepared to
craft and implement a coherent program to protect the nation’s cities…posed a set of
challenges to the complex, decentralized division of functions among levels of
government” (p. 537). Further, Mushkatel and Weschler (1985) stated that these domestic
security and response situations “must be a cooperative intergovernmental venture. That
is, our orientation is toward joint government efforts rather than domination by any single
level of government” (p. 53). Thompson (2002) also described this critical
intergovernmental challenge post 9/11 focused on how all levels of governments will
individually and collectively perform homeland security” (p. 18).
The new paradigm of catastrophic terrorism threats from groups such as al Qaeda
requires more highly effective governance which calls for “a new breed of collaborative
federalism” (Kincaid & Cole, 2002, p. 181). Government security agencies from the
federal level all the way down to the local level must be integrated in a manner that
enables the collaborative prevention of all types of catastrophic events such as terrorist
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attacks. However, this effective collaboration has been elusive and filled with tensions
due to overlapping responsibilities, bureaucratic challenges as well as personality clashes.
Interagency Challenges with Roles, Missions and Jurisdiction
Some federal agencies—the FBI in particular—are famous for having frequent
jurisdictional disputes with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. One
Department of Justice audit stated “Historically, there had been no clear division of
responsibilities. This often resulted in delays of criminal investigations because of
jurisdictional disputes, and wasted resources because investigative work was often
duplicated” (Department of Justice, 1996, Section I, para. 5). This situation became more
complicated when the Department of Homeland Security was created after 9/11 to
prevent terrorist attacks, but the FBI still retained the sole authority to investigate
terrorism and disrupt terrorist attacks within the United States.
The FBI successfully fought to remain outside the DHS as it was being formed as
a new agency, and the bifurcated nature of domestic security as it relates to terrorism
remains in place today. The tension between these two agencies is famous and
bureaucratic battles waged during and after as the FBI fought to stay out of the new DHS
(Perrow, 2006). The first Secretary of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge (2009), stated that
when it came to the FBI it “was a constant battle to convince them we weren’t the
enemy” and he further wrote that the FBI “went out of its way to emasculate DHS” (pp.
161-162).
As a result of this separation and the continuing bifurcated arrangement, the FBI
maintains over 100 JTTFs around the country while DHS sponsors 78 separate state and
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local fusion centers (Randol, 2009b). Each of these separate inter-agency organizations
overlaps and fights for limited federal funding which ends up limiting effectiveness of
both (Lawrence, 2008, p. 8). The FBI retains their authorities, while DHS chooses to fund
their own initiatives, and this leaves state and cities forced to separately interact with both
federal agencies on terrorism issues. As of 2015, only 12 JTTFs and fusion centers have
been combined or collocated (Hoffman, Meese, & Roemer, 2015).
A study of law enforcement interagency cooperation since 9/11found that
“[t]erritorial, jurisdictional and interpersonal conflicts also got in the way of efficient
cooperation, both within between [sic] law enforcement agencies, and between the law
enforcement and intelligence communities” (Middlemiss & Gupta, 2007, p. 139). These
difficulties become further complicated when federal law enforcement agencies interact
with the over 18,000 state and local agencies across the country, many of which have
different agency cultures and may not have positive relationships among themselves for
various reasons (Middlemiss & Gupta, 2007, p. 139; Domash, 2004, para. 18). There are
even instances where state and local agencies have been caught in the middle of “turf
wars” between federal agencies (Roebuck, 2009, para. 17). The FBI has also clashed with
nonfederal agencies as well. Michael Sheehan the former deputy commissioner for
counterterrorism at the New York Police Department and former ambassador at large for
counterterrorism wrote in 2009 that
The FBI and New York Police Department remain engaged in a
counterproductive bureaucratic struggle…clashed over releasing threat warnings
to the public and to private-sector entities. The FBI claimed ownership of the
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information (usually obtained by federal intelligence sources like the National
Security Agency or the CIA) and wanted to dominate the podium at news
conferences. (para. 4)
The tensions are not exclusive to the FBI, and Kahn (2009) wrote that DHS and
the FBI fought over their roles during response to Hurricane Katrina, and stated that DHS
has been under “continual inter- and intra-agency conflict. For example, Homeland
Security and the Justice Department, which includes the FBI and DEA, both are tasked
with gathering intelligence and sharing it with state and local law enforcement officials”
(para. 4). This country has three levels of government and many different roles and
functions performed across all levels. A snapshot of the overlapping government
responsibilities with regard to domestic security is provided below in Table 1.
Table 1
Overlapping Government Responsibilities in Domestic Security
Law
Enforcement

Intelligence
Sharing

Intelligence
Collection

Security

Federal

FBI, ATF, Etc

DHS, FBI

Natl. Intel.
Community

Dept. of Def.
& DHS/FBI

State

State Police

Fusion Center

Citizens and
Police reports

State police and
Natl. Guard

City

City Police

Fusion Center

Citizens and
Police reports

City Police

However, this chart does not fully depict all the overlapping roles and functions at
each level, which might be best represented by a complex series of overlapping circles in
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a Venn diagram. The 9/11 Commission Report outlined how these interagency tensions
extend beyond just the wall between law enforcement and intelligence. Some of the
clashes are based on the personalities involved, but many really stem from the conflicting
and overlapping roles, missions and jurisdictions. This is unfortunate since federal, state
and local officials have all strived to better protect citizens in this new age of terrorism.
Importance of State and Local Agencies in Combatting Terrorism
The 9/11 attacks were not only a wake-up call for the federal government to do
better at countering terrorism, but it drove state and local governments to make terrorism
a priority as well. Although terrorism cases may be under the purview of the FBI, all
terrorist actions start out at as a local issue. Also, the federal government asked state and
local officials after 9/11 to ramp up security at possible terrorist targets and critical
infrastructure such as bridges, nuclear power plants, and airports. Bjelopera and Randol
(2010) emphasized the importance of these Nonfederal agencies when they wrote,
The role of state, local, and tribal law enforcement in detecting nascent terrorist
plotting is particularly important, especially considering the challenges involved
in detecting lone wolves and homegrown jihadist groups with few connections to
larger terrorist organizations. Nine years after the 9/11 attacks, integrating state,
local, and tribal law enforcement into the national counterterrorism effort
continues to be an abiding concern of policymakers. (p. 4)
In order to effectively combat terrorism, local law enforcement officers need to be
aware of signs of radicalization and realize that “terrorists are living all over the U.S. and
they can be plotting an attack against a target even while living several states away”
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(Ernst, 2014, para. 2). As Congressman McCaul (2014) stated in a House Homeland
Security hearing, “State and Local police have a strong role in Counter Terrorism. They
know the streets better than anybody and they know the local threats…They must know
the terror threats in their own backyards” (p. 2).
One of the key lessons of the 9/11 attacks is that many government sectors must
collaborate across the spectrum of law enforcement, security, and even first responders to
develop “strategies as a multifaceted, layered approach, understanding that no single
approach succeeds by itself” (Ellis, 2014, p. 220). Even Robert Mueller as the Director of
the FBI at the time, stated that “No one agency or department can handle these diverse
challenges” (Mueller, 2010, para. 24). While there have been efforts to improve
interorganizational collaboration after 9/11, this history of interagency challenges and
‘bad blood’ between these entities remains an intergovernmental challenge when it comes
to CT.
Domestic Counterterrorism Reforms
In response to the 9/11 attacks, a number of governmental reforms emerged to
address weaknesses in securing the homeland. This section will outline some of the major
reforms. Most significant to this study includes the creation of three new entities; the
Department of Homeland Security; the Director of National Intelligence; and a National
Security Branch within the FBI. Burch (2007) describes these post 9/11 reforms as,
The major change was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security with
an intelligence charter. The U.S. government also adopted measures to implement
intelligence coordination and improve identified shortfalls through the creation of
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the Director for National Intelligence (DNI), the National Counter Terrorism
Center (NCTC), and revamping the FBI’s intelligence capability. (p. 16)
Each of these new entities have a role in preventing terrorism within the United
States, and each of them all impact on state and local fusion centers.
Creation of the Department of Homeland Security
The most significant change in the organization of the U.S. government since the
National Security Act of 1947 was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security
which incorporated almost two dozen different government agencies and around 179,000
employees into a single agency (Perl, 2004). The government decided to consolidate into
one large new agency many domestic protection functions such as “border and
transportation security, effective response to domestic terrorism incidents, and ensuring
homeland security” (Relyea, 2003, p. 617). The DHS was formed by collecting 22
different security, customs, immigration, and disaster assistance focused agencies
together into one department (King, 2009, p. 152).
This newest government arm entails seven operating components or field agencies
such as the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Secret Service,
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) (King, 2009, p. 155). This
major reorganization merged myriad tasks of many diverse agencies in order to collect
them under one large department (Huang, 2007). While a well-intentioned plan to better
secure the nation through centralization, it was also criticized by some, including former
White House Counterterrorism ‘Czar’ Richard Clarke (2004) who called it a “wiring
diagram fix less able to deal with domestic security…for years to come” (p. 249).

41
The purpose to centralize these efforts was clearly intended to harmonize the
domestic security functions and reduce interagency communication and coordination
issues. However domestic security efforts overall are still highly disjointed with key
federal security agencies like the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and others remaining outside of the DHS organization (Lehrer, 2004, p.
85; Wise, 2006, p. 306). Kahn wrote in 2009 that for effective domestic counterterrorism
there are many “external agencies and departments Homeland Security must coordinate
with (the CIA, FBI, DEA, and Health and Human Services, among others)” (para 3). In
describing this disconnect, Filler (2010) stated:
Since its inception, DHS has had to deal with federal agencies and authorities
necessary to carry out the homeland security mission being kept outside the
department…While DHS does play an important role in the current homeland
security structure, it is a far cry from how it was marketed during its founding, as
well as how it's perceived by the public today. (para. 15)
With all of these factors in mind it is important to note that although DHS has
Homeland Security in its title, it is far from being a ‘one stop shopping’ agency for
domestic security.
In addition to many key domestic security agencies being outside the
organization, is the challenge of now harmonizing the separate and still often distinct
efforts of the DHS components. Bringing together the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs
Enforcement efforts under the same federal agency does not alleviate the many years of
interagency tension between them or essentially eliminate conflicting roles and
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jurisdictions by itself. In one way it can be stated that creating DHS the government only
replaced interagency issues between these components and made them intra-agency
challenges. This is especially the case since the Secretary of Homeland Security is not an
operational position and he or she cannot order the field agencies to do anything (Ridge,
2009, p. 213). DHS is still striving to fully absorb all these different missions and cultures
into a cohesive whole, and as on senior DHS official stated, “As post-9/11 operational
necessity drove DHS’ formation from disparate legacy agencies, complex new
departmental responsibilities obliged us to work together in enterprise fashion and forge a
collaborative…culture” (Wagner, 2011, p. 3).
Two of the main functions of DHS that relate to fusion centers deal with the
disbursement of federal funds to support state and local efforts to counter terrorism and
information and intelligence sharing. As Caruson and MacManus (2006) stated, “DHS
functions as the lead agency for the distribution of federal grant money and the locus of
coordination between federal, state, and local governments” (p. 523). A number of these
grants are used by states and major urban areas to fund their fusion centers. A completely
different challenge DHS faces has to do with providing subfederal agencies with
intelligence and information for countering terrorism.
The main limitation with DHS and intelligence has to do with the fact that it was
specifically created not to be a domestic intelligence gathering agency, but to only
analyze reports provided to it from other agencies (Randol, 2010). This has forced DHS
to take a more non-traditional approach to ‘intelligence’ and to not just seek ‘state
secrets’ but to also focus on the many thousands of routine, everyday observations and
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activities such as suspicious activity reports (Chertoff, 2005). However, this means that
for traditional and mainly classified intelligence, DHS has to principally rely on the many
agencies that constitute the U.S. Intelligence Community. Another major centralization
reform that came about as a reaction to the 9/11 attacks was the creation of a Director of
National Intelligence to lead this community.
Creation of the Director of National Intelligence
One of the significant findings of the 9/11 Commission was that there was no true
leadership over the constellation of intelligence agencies that had grown up during World
War II and continued to grow during the Cold War (Kean & Hamilton, 2004; Zegart,
2005). The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency nominally held the title of
“Director of Central Intelligence” that meant he was supposed to lead the whole
community, but that title was next to empty as it came with no authority to direct other
agencies—who already reported to Department heads of other major federal agencies
(Gutjahr, 2005).
Based upon the recommendations of the 9/11 Commissioners and others, a new
position of Director of National Intelligence or DNI was created (Hitz, 2012). However,
this leadership issue was just one factor that attributed to the lack of effective intelligence
to support the Nation, and in particular, effectively collaborate on terrorism threats across
these many agencies and “Ensuring the integration of foreign and domestic intelligence
collection and analysis, as the 9/11 Commission recommended, is one of the most
important responsibilities given to the Office of the DNI” (McConnell, 2007, para. 6).
Other issues had to do with uncoordinated multi-agency terrorism analytical efforts, and
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the many different databases these various agencies each held independently on terrorists
and terror groups (Best, 2011).
In light of these challenges, the government decided to simultaneously deal with
the issues of terrorism analysis—the failure to ‘connect the dots’ about 9/11—and the
need to bring together these terrorism databased in one fell swoop (Berkeley et al, 2012).
The concept that first started as the Terrorism Threat Integration Center (TTIC), ended up
evolving into the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) which was directly
subordinated to the new Director of National Intelligence (Gutjahr, 2005). As Best (2011)
stated in a report to Congress on the responsibilities of this new interagency government
terrorism center,
Within the sprawling U.S. Intelligence Community, the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was specifically established in 2004 to bring
together all available information on terrorism, analyze the information, and
provide warning of potential attacks on the U.S. (p. 1).
Another role for the Office of the DNI or ODNI, is the task to improve
intelligence and information-sharing between and among different government agencies
that have a role in countering terrorism. ODNI did this in cooperation with DHS and the
Department of Justice by developing a government-wide information-sharing backbone
called the Information-sharing Environment or ISE (Lahneman, 2004; Verton, 2011). The
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act or IRTPA (2004) directed the
establishment of the ISE as well as a Program Manager (PM) to plan for and manage the
ISE to ensure information is shared across federal agencies. This PM-ISE establishes
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standards, procedures, and instructions across the government to enable more effective
terrorism information-sharing, and included in these efforts is the goal to better share
intelligence and information with mission partners at the state and local levels (Paul,
2015).
These efforts to reform the Intelligence Community, and improve terrorism
analysis and information-sharing have increased collaboration and access to some
terrorism data. However, many challenges still remain as this study addressed. One of the
challenges that creating DNI and NCTC did not address for the homeland is the limitation
in the IRTPA which explicitly excludes NCTC from housing data on purely domestic
terrorism, as that is under the purview of the FBI.
Creation of the National Security Branch within the FBI.
The FBI is a domestically focused agency, and it had a tortured history of poor
relations with the CIA for example (Gorman, 2003). In the most basic sense, the CIA
collected intelligence on threats overseas while the FBI focused on enforcing laws at
home (Sales, 2010). These different missions resulted in “fault lines in our government—
between foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence” which significantly contributed
to the government’s inability to “connect the dots” and see the 9/11 attacks coming (Kean
& Hamilton, 2004, p. xvii). The 9/11 Commission and other investigations of government
terrorism efforts that went on before and during 2001 all identified many lapses on the
part of the FBI. This agency was originally set up to deal with crime in a different era, so
the many independent Field Offices in major cities around the country were not
coordinated with or among each other, nor did headquarters have any real knowledge of
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what investigations were going on inside these Field Offices as they were essentially
“balkanized fiefdoms of the FBI” (Perrow, 2006, p. 22).
Functionally law enforcement agencies are very different from those who perform
primarily intelligence roles, with the former being almost singularly focused on
investigating and prosecuting crimes that have been committed, while the latter operates
in the very grey area of trying to anticipate events and preempt them when possible
(Gorman, 2003; Zegart, 2007). This results in divergent agency perspectives based on
these different missions, which can also manifest itself in differing and often conflicting
organizational cultures (Riebling, 2002). The FBI had a very strong law enforcement
centric perspective and culture (Desai, 2005; Jeffreys-Jones, 2007). As a result of this
mission and culture, U.S. Attorney Robert Mueller took over as Director of the FBI just
days before 9/11, and he inherited a very antiquated agency with case files that were kept
in shoe boxes dispersed among the many field offices around the country (Kean &
Hamilton, 2004; Zegart, 2009).
While the 9/11 Commission and Congress felt the FBI had to change its culture,
others said it was the mission that needed to change (Wyllie, 2011). When pressed by
President Bush immediately after 9/11 to change the FBI’s focus from just investigating
attacks after they happen to instead identifying threats and disrupting attacks in advance,
Director Mueller replied “That’s our new mission, preventing attacks” (Bush, 2010, p.
145). However, some said the FBI was beyond repair and discussed ideas to start over or
create a new domestic intelligence agency, so in an effort “To avoid dismemberment,
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Mueller made bold promises to cure what ailed the FBI from within—rebuilding it into a
modern, intelligence-driven enterprise” (Gellman, 2011, para. 10).
So the new top priority of the FBI became preventing terrorist attacks, and
Director Mueller worked to steer the ship of the agency to focus on terrorism as the top
priority (Bohm & Haley, 2012). However, changing culture is very challenging and takes
time. So Director Mueller also made significant personnel changes to focus the Bureau
more on intelligence and counterterrorism (Mueller, 2010). As a part of this effort, the
FBI reinforced the Counterterrorism Division (CTD), and not only made terrorism its top
investigative priority, it also
shifted resources to this area from its more traditional law enforcement activities,
such as drug, white-collar, and violent crime. In addition to transferring hundreds
of agents and support staff from criminal areas to counterterrorism, the FBI also
subsequently hired thousands of additional agents, intelligence analysts, and other
professional support staff to fulfill its mission. (Maurer, 2012, p. 1)
While a number of analysts and experts still felt that a new domestic intelligence
agency should be created akin to the MI5 in the UK, both the 9/11 Commission and the
Robb-Silberman ‘WMD’ Commission rejected these proposals (Cumming, 2005). The
government had decided to instead reform the FBI into a law enforcement agency, but
one with intelligence functions within the homeland. Director Mueller was able to make
some strides to mold the Bureau to have a more preemptive mindset and be a better
networked organization, but he could not do it alone, and changing the culture and
organization were still very much a work in progress four years after 9/11 (Cumming,
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2005). Ultimately it took a formal and public memorandum in 2005 from then President
Bush to the Attorney General directing that he create a new National Security service
within the FBI (Bush, 2005). In the memo, President Bush specified that this new
‘national security’ focused organization within the FBI would,
Combine the missions, capabilities, and resources of the counterterrorism,
counterintelligence, and intelligence elements of the FBI into a new National
Security Service…to build an FBI National Security Service workforce, including
special agents, intelligence analysts, and as appropriate, other personnel,
necessary to the effective performance of the national security missions of the
FBI. (Bush, 2005, para. 4)
This memo ended up being the catalyst for creating the National Security Branch
of the FBI which contains the Counterterrorism Division as well as counterintelligence
and intelligence functions (Richelson, 2012). So, this change essentially reorganized the
FBI into an agency with “two core functions: national security and criminal
investigations” (Vizzard, 2008, p. 1080). In both of these areas the FBI strives to be a
“threat-driven, intelligence-led organization. We are collecting, analyzing, and sharing
intelligence to better understand all threats” (Mueller, 2010, para. 17).
The new National Security Branch of the FBI took an equal place in the Bureau
alongside criminal investigations, a major organizational and cultural change (Cumming,
2005). One of the existing frameworks that was previously directly under each
independent FBI Field Office, was the many Joint Terrorist Task Forces or JTTFs around
the country. In this 2005 reorganization the Counterterror or CT Division was interjected
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into the supervisory line for all JTTFs. Fuller (2008) described the history and post 9/11
growth of JTTFs,
The JTTF program was established by the FBI’s CT division based on a 1980
New York City task force model that incorporated members from federal, state,
and local law enforcement to combat an increasing number of terrorist bombings.
Prior to 9/11, there were 35 JTTFs in existence throughout the United States. The
FBI has since expanded the number of JTTFs to one at each of its 56 field offices
and to approximately 46 of its annexes. (p. 4)
Fuller (2008) goes on to describe how there are more than 2,000 “non-FBI
personnel from more than 600 federal, state, and local agencies currently participate on
JTTFs in support of terrorist-related investigations” (p. 4). It is important to note the
wording from Fuller in that he did not call the non-FBI personnel “members” of the
JTTF, but stated they “participate” on JTTFs and “in support of” terrorism investigations
– an important distinction. While created and describing these JTTFs as multiagency
investigatory bodies, they are still formally part of the FBI, and “even though many
agencies contribute to them, the FBI’s ‘Joint Terrorism Task Forces’ are FBI-centric”
(Desai, 2005, p. 61).
To supervise all these JTTFs and to provide a hub for their interactions, and new
national level JTTF was stood up as a part of CTD. According to Fuller (2008), The FBI
also created the National NJTTF (NJTTF), “a multiagency task force co-located with the
National Counterterrorism Center in McLean, Virginia. The NJTTF serves as a point of
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fusion for 44 federal, state, and local agencies, each providing full-time representatives
and meeting daily to share timely CT-related information” (p. 4).
At their heart, these JTTFs are primarily focused on investigating terrorism cases,
and have not proved to be a significant conduit for interagency information-sharing
(Cordner & Scarborough, 2010). An example of the JTTFs being essentially an FBI
organization is how the Bureau did not allow non-FBI ‘partners’ inside a JTTF to share
information with anyone outside the JTTF without express permission. The FBI publicly
acknowledged in a press release that stated, “JTTF-generated information may only be
disseminated outside the structure of the JTTF (including to a member’s home agency)
with the approval of the JTTF FBI supervisor” (FBI, 2009, para. 8). Those non-FBI
personnel working in a JTTF are on “detailed” duty from their home agency and often
referred to as detailees. A U.S. Senate Report (2011) about JTTFs stated the following:
The FBI's vision of JTTFs as being interagency information-sharing and
operational coordination mechanisms is sound, but the…JTTF model has not
fulfilled the vision completely in practice…JTTF detailees lack access to key
databases. As a result, we have concerns that the culture of JTTFs may be that
they are FBI investigative entities, with detailees to JTTFs essentially serving as
additional personnel to augment the FBI. (p. 51)
FBI JTTFs are “a model for successful interagency coordination on a government
wide basis” but just because JTTFs “have engaged in successful operations does not
make the case that the U.S. has determined how best to share information within its law
enforcement community or between the law enforcement community and its intelligence
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agencies” (Middlemiss & Gupta, 2007, p. 141). While the FBI is the lead federal agency
for domestic counterterrorism, that does not mean they are necessarily the best agency for
sharing terrorism information with state and local officials. As the Senate Report (2011)
found “we are concerned that JTTFs may not be fulfilling their intended role as
interagency information-sharing and operational coordination mechanisms” (p. 87).
Assigning personnel to these JTTFs has been a challenge since arduous
background investigations need to be completed to give detailees security clearances.
There are also challenges with what work detailees are allowed to do and who the FBI
really wants as participants in a JTTF. One study found that the FBI was looking for
people just like them to be assigned, and a study by Zegart (2015) reported,
The FBI mainly wanted detailees to the JTTFs who were sworn federal law
enforcement officers, which meant they could carry guns, wear badges, and were
authorized to enforce all federal laws just like the FBI. In fact, the Pentagon had
tried sending more skilled analysts and personnel with counterterrorism
experience from the Army and Air Force years earlier. But because they were
active duty personnel and not sworn federal law enforcement officers, Army and
Air Force detailees were often relegated to clerical work on the task forces. (p. 45)
These drawbacks do not take away from the many successes that JTTFs have had,
such as disrupting an attack on a shopping mall outside Chicago (McNeil, Carafano, &
Zuckerman, 2011). However, Hitz (2012) notes that “Simply deputizing FBI and other
law enforcement officers as intelligence professionals will not enable the intelligence
community to overcome the bureaucratic stovepipes that have hindered interagency
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cooperation in the past” (p. 255). As a result, “Calls for further FBI reforms have
continued” (Burch, 2007, p. 16).
Today the FBI still has terrorism as its number one mission, but with the current
threats from overseas groups as well as homegrown extremists recruited on the internet,
the FBI clearly faces a significant shortfall in resources to deal with these manifold
threats. This resource issue is most pressing with a lack of sufficient manpower and tools
to investigate terrorism with FBI agents nationally than there are more police officers in
New York City alone, and terrorism is only one of many federal crimes the Bureau has to
deal with (Shedd, 2016). The FBI clearly cannot handle terrorism threats alone, and more
and deeper partnerships are needed with state and local agencies.
In a recent follow up report to the 9/11 Commission, a detailed document and
field study was done of the FBI and it found the continued widespread “perception that
sharing with the Bureau is still too much of a one-way street” (Hoffman, Meese &
Roemer, 2015, p. 83). However, some analysts and experts such as former DHS senior
official Matt Mayer (2016) strongly advocated for the FBI JTTFs to be the lead and for
fusion center to merge with them. While these reforms of the FBI in creating a National
Security Branch and expanding JTTFs are important and admirable efforts, there is still
clearly a need for nonfederal fusion centers which do focus on intelligence and
information-sharing as a primary effort.
Nonfederal Fusion Centers
Subfederal fusion centers at the state and local levels started well before 2001, but
the terrorist attacks of that year provided the catalyst for their rapid growth around the
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country. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks the leaders of states and major urban areas
received numerous—and often non-specific—federal warnings about possible al Qaeda
terrorist threats. These subfederal leaders received only unclassified general warnings,
and they also lacked the capability to effectively analyze these reports or put them into
context to be relevant to their jurisdictions. Lacking specificity into these threats from the
federal government and being without capability to analyze the threats were the dual
catalysts that spurred on the spread of subfederal fusion centers after 9/11. Before
examining the evolution of fusion centers, this literature review will first explore their
beginnings in the 1980s and their growth after 9/11.
History of Fusion Centers
During the 1980s and 1990s a number of regions within the U.S. moved toward
various forms of domestic intelligence fusion centers to counter the flow of illegal drugs
into the country (Carter and Carter, 2009).
As Canas (2012) writes in Homeland Security at the State Level,
The popularity of such fusion centers reached a crest during the so-called ‘war on
drugs’ in the mid-80s. Interagency centers such as the El Paso Intelligence Center
(EPIC), the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), and numerous state and
regional crime Intelligence Centers were formed to facilitate the operational
information needs of the law enforcement community (p. 36).
Another inspiration for law enforcement agencies to move toward a fusion center
model was the Intelligence Led Policing (ILP) concept from the 1990s which focuses on
gathering intelligence and conducting analysis to support proactive law enforcement
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(Hylton, 2009; Lambert, 2010). At their heart, fusion centers work to bring together
various agencies focused on a common problem that required information-sharing and
analytical efforts. Shepard (2011), stated that “The concept of the fusion center is quite
simple: to facilitate the sharing of homeland security related and crime-related
information and intelligence within the law enforcement community” (p. 36). According
to the Department of Justice (2005),
The principal role of the fusion center is to compile, blend, analyze, and
disseminate criminal intelligence and other information (including but not limited
to threat assessment, public safety, law enforcement, public health, social service,
and public works) to support efforts to anticipate, identify, prevent, and/or
monitor criminal activity. (p. 3)
After the 9/11 attacks and the many ominous warnings of potential follow on
terrorist attacks, many governors and mayors felt they were not getting the intelligence
and information they needed about terror threats from the federal government, so state
and local fusion centers spread rapidly across the country (German & Stanley, 2007).
Numerous states and major urban centers around the nation desired to improve their
sharing of criminal information and to coordinate joint efforts. Carter and Carter (2009)
described the intent of fusion centers “to marshal the resources and expertise of multiple
agencies within the region to deal with cross-jurisdictional crime problems” (p. 1324).
Fusion centers really started “as a national grassroots initiative” pushed by the demand
signal from the state and local levels leaders, but it did not take long for the federal
government to jump on board (Serrao, 2010).
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Military Counterterrorism Fusion Centers
There are also counterterrorism fusion centers employed by the military which
bring together many national intelligence agencies and military intelligence capabilities
to successful collect on and collaboratively analyze overseas terrorist groups. One well
known example of a successful military fusion center effort was contributing to the defeat
of al Qaeda in Iraq during the 2004-2011 timeframe (Lamb & Munsing, 2011). The
concept is very similar to the intent for domestic counterterrorism fusion centers, and the
idea came from the then Deputy Commander of Joint Special Operations Task Force 714,
Rear Admiral William McRaven who said, “We need a joint interagency task force
(JIATF)…we need CIA, we need FBI, we need everybody, all the three-letter intelligence
agencies. If we don’t understand what CIA’s doing, or what FBI’s doing, or NSA, then
we’re missing things. They have information we’re not seeing” (Shultz, 2016, p. 26).
The commander of Task Force 714, General Stanley McChrystal then had to
convince each agency to join the JIATF and to “collaborate in a work environment of
interdependency, cooperation, trust, and transparency” (Shultz, 2016. p.26). The
commander “had to overcome the reluctance of other agencies to participate in building a
counter network to tackle the metastasizing terrorist network assembled by Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi in Iraq” (Henriksen, 2013, p.54). General McChrystal himself stated that the
JIATF is,
a way to fuse the various intelligence agencies’ specialties in order to better
understand the enemy. It would leverage the CIA’s ‘human intelligence’ from
spies and sources; the National Security Agency’s intercepted signals; the FBI’s
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forensic and investigative expertise; the Defense Intelligence Agency’s military
reach; and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency’s (NGA) dazzling
mapping ability (McChrystal, 2013).
Over time this approach worked and the JIATF became a true fusion center that
was deployed overseas to bring together representative from all these various agencies to
effectively collaborate intelligence on terrorist cells and leaders. Henriksen (2013) noted
that the “natural tendency of the intelligence community is to hoard information” but
General McChrystal “made his teams share intelligence” (p. 50). According to Lamb and
Munsing (2011), it was the coupling of this collaborative all-source intelligence fusion
center effort with targeted special operations raids became the secret weapon’ that found
and killed Zarqawi and eventually defeated al Qaeda in Iraq.
Fusion Centers Evolve
Similarly, domestic fusion centers after 9/11 were originally intended as clearing
houses for threats and intelligence, and to ‘connect the dots’ and detect an actual terrorist
plot (Apuzzo & Goldman, 2013). However, there was little that state and local agencies
could do on their own without federal intelligence and information on terrorist threats. So
fusion centers were “developed, in part, from a joint project with the federal intelligence
community, including DHS and DOJ” (Serrao, 2010, para. 4). Although federal grant
money came in from DHS for fusion centers “it did not take long to realize that, in most
cities, the threat was not enough to justify all the manpower, money, and equipment. So
in many states, the fusion center mission crept toward something broader” (Apuzzo &
Goldman, 2013, p. 162).
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While the original purpose for subfederal fusion centers after 9/11 was for sharing
terrorism information, Larence (2008) wrote for the U.S. Government Accountability
Office that the “majority of the centers had scopes of operations and missions that
included more than just combating terrorism-related activities, such as a focus on all
crimes or all hazards” (p. 3). As a result, many states and major urban areas have
realistically co-located their fusions center with the functionally related Emergency
Operations Centers (EOCs) in order to further improve cooperation (DHS/DOJ, 2010, p.
20).
Today there are 78 states and major urban regions that have formed their own
fusion centers “…to share information and intelligence about terrorist threats, criminal
activity, and other hazards” (Department of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 67). Rollins
(2008) describes how state and local fusion centers take their broad array of locally
gathered information from law enforcement, the public, and the private sector sources
and it gets “fused with intelligence collected and produced by the federal Intelligence
Community to better understand threat and assist in directing security resources” (pp. 56). The role and mission of each fusion center is based on the particular needs of each
state or major urban area that owns it. This was discussed by the Washington DC fusion
center director, Lee Wight (2015) who stated,
Each of the 78 centers is tailored uniquely to serve their particular area of
responsibility…some fusion centers are investigative such as Boston….some are
very tactical in their focus, i.e. case support for their local law enforcement
agencies…we are strategic intelligence…more akin to operational intelligence,
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i.e. regional trends and patterns is what we look at. Some centers are a watch, i.e.
they report events and direct actions in the community. (Wight, 2015)
These fusion centers serve a significant function in providing a framework for
agencies to share information and intelligence with state and local officials that did not
exist before 9/11. As the Presidential Executive Order on intelligence activities says,
State, local, and tribal governments are critical partners in securing and defending
the United States from terrorism and other threats to the United States and its
interests. Our national intelligence effort should take into account the
responsibilities and requirements of State, local, and tribal governments…when
undertaking the collection and dissemination of information and intelligence to
protect the United States. (Bush, 2008, Part 1)
The Body of Fusion Center Research
State and local fusion centers have been studied empirically by a number of
researchers, since they are an important component of the homeland security enterprise.
A significant number of studies and masters theses have addressed fusion centers
including those from Carter, Carter, Chermak and McGarrell (2016), Carter, and
Chermak (2012), Chen (2009), Coffey (2015), Comiskey (2008), Forsyth (2005),
Fresenko (2010), Fries (2013), Fussell (2009), Graphia (2010), Harper (2009), Klem
(2014), Ladner (2010), Larence (2008, 2010), Leavell (2007), Levin and Coburn (2012),
McGregor (2010), Monahan (2009). Newbill (2008), Newkirk (2010), Regan and
Monahan (2013, 2014, 2015), Rollins (2008), Saari (2010), Scott (2014), and Skahill
(2010). As stated by Cilluffo, Clark, and Downing (2011), “Little empirical research,
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however, has been done to study the weaving together of local, state, and federal
counterterrorism efforts” (p. 1). Further, Taylor and Russel (2012) stated “Though fusion
centers have been in operation for nearly a decade, there is a noticeable absence of
information as to their effectiveness. Virtually no empirical evaluations have been
conducted on them” (p. 195).
As described earlier in this chapter, state and local officials do have a critical role
in protecting citizens in this federal republic with overlapping security responsibilities
across all 3 levels of government. The FBI is not resourced to be able to deal with all the
terrorist threats and reports that come in across the country, so this must be a
collaborative effort. That is one of the main reasons why “these fusion centers have been
created across the United States. Each is staffed with personnel from multiple agencies
that help facilitate local, state, county and federal data sharing” (Serrao, 2010, para. 4).
Interorganizational Intelligence and Information-sharing
Interagency information-sharing is critical to the safety and security of this
Nation. If the federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies had shared with each
other what was known within their organizations about the al Qaeda terrorists before
9/11, and if this were then shared with state and local officials, it is very possible those
attacks in 2001 could have been prevented (Zegart, 2009). While improvements certainly
have been made since 9/11, interagency information-sharing is still very much a work in
progress some 16 years later.
This issue is a significant challenge since sharing information among these
numerous actors involves many overlapping statutory responsibilities, legal authorities,
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and capabilities between these levels of government and multitude of agencies that
pertain to countering terrorism (Imperial, 2005; Eack, 2008). However, these challenges
are not completely unique to countering terrorism, as several other public sector functions
have similar multi-agency and political challenges. This leads to the public administrative
and policy theoretical framework that is employed in this study.
Theoretical Framework for Interorganizational Information-sharing
The study employed the theoretical framework of interagency informationsharing, in particular the opportunities it offers and the obstacles that prevent it from
being effective. This theoretical basis is primarily derived from Sharon S. Dawes,
Professor Emerita of Public Administration and Policy at the State University of New
York at Albany. In 1996 Dawes conducted a study into the exchange of information
between multiple agencies and publised an article titled Interagency Information-sharing:
Expected Benefits, Manegeable Risks in the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management.
In short, her study was based on the premise that “sharing of program information
among government agencies can help achieve important public benefits: increased
productivity; improved policymaking; and integrated public services. Informationsharing, however, is often limited by technical, organizational, and political barriers”
(Dawes, 1996, p. 377). This study examined the attitudes and opinions of government
managers and showed they viewed interagency information-sharing to be beneficial and
also revealed concerns about the organizational risks as well, and “The study proposes a
theoretical model for understanding how policy, practice, and attitudes interact…to
promote the benefits and mitigate the risks of sharing” (Dawes, 1996, p. 377). An
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example of the Dawes theoretical framework as it relates to interorganizational
information-sharing describes the technical, organizational and political aspects of both
the benefits and barriers in Table 2.
Table 2
Categories of benefits and barriers associated with interagency information-sharing
Category

Benefits

Barriers

Technical

-Streamlined data management
-Contributes to information
infrastructure

-Incompatible technologies
-Inconsistent data structures

Organizational

-Supports problem solving
-Expands professional networks

-Organizational self-interest
-Dominant professional
frameworks

Political

-Supports domain-level action
-Improves public accountability
-Fosters program and service
coordination

-External influences over
decision-making
-Power of agency discretion
-Primacy of programs

Dawes, 1996, p. 378

This construct of interorganizational information-sharing was employed again by
Zhang, Dawes, and Sarkis (2005), when they studied stakeholder expectations and how
they are influenced by barriers and benefits to interorganizational information-sharing.
These researchers stated, “It can be theorized that the expectation of benefits provides
motivation for participants to engage in innovative efforts to share practice-related
knowledge; while the expectation of barriers may undermine participants’ commitment to
knowledge sharing initiatives and willingness to take risks” (Zhang, Dawes, & Sarkis,
2005, p. 549).
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In 2009 Dawes employed this theoretical framework again with Cresswell and
Pardo in an article titled From 'Need to Know' to 'Need to Share': Tangled Problems,
Information Boundaries, and the Building of Public Sector Knowledge Networks. In this
latest study they identified that,
While public sector knowledge networks offer significant potential benefits for
dealing with both wicked and tangled problems, our research suggests that they
also face two sets of challenges that make them difficult to develop and sustain.
One has to do with the nature of knowledge and the other with complexities of the
boundaries to be navigated. (Dawes, Cresswell & Pardo 2009, p. 394)
It is evident that this model is relevant as a framework to study interagency
information-sharing at fusion centers. Therefore, this research adapted Dawes (1996)
theoretical framework to identify the opportunities and obstacles of federal interagency
information sharing with nonfederal fusion centers. Clearly the greatest benefit of
intelligence sharing in a homeland security context primarily comes from being able to
share intelligence in order to collaboratively piece together available information and
prevent terrorist attacks. Other opportunities and benefits also exsit for domestic
counterterrorism.
In regard to the barriers, some interagency literature offers a listing of various
obstacles. One useful publication in this field is the 2009 military handbook titled
Interagency Teaming to Counter Irregular Threats. This handbook includes some of
these examples for barriers such as: legal, policy, procedural, lack of organizational
mechanisms, classification/sensitivity, physical/virtual impediments, risk aversion,
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inadequate incentives, organizational culture, and personality issues (U.S. Army
Asymmetric Warfare Group, 2009). While this listing is not all-inclusive, it is a good
starting point.
Domestic Counterterrorism Information-sharing
Sharing information and intelligence on terrorism for the homeland is a wicked
problem due to the complexities of the different levels of government and the many
various agencies involved (Dawes, Cresswell, & Pardo, 2009). Some of these challenges
were mentioned in the 9/11 Commission Report, and some issues partially remedied in
some new laws such as the USA PATRIOT ACT and the IRTPA (Adams, Nordhaus, &
Shellenberger, 2011). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 made this interagency sharing
of terrorism information a task for the new DHS and codified this role as,
To disseminate, as appropriate, information analyzed by the Department within
the Department, to other agencies of the Federal Government with responsibilities
relating to homeland security, and to agencies of State and local governments and
private sector entities with such responsibilities in order to assist in the deterrence,
prevention, preemption of, or response to, terrorist attacks against the United
States. (U.S. Code, 2002, PL 107–296 § 201, 9)
In order to accomplish this task, the Department of Homeland Security created
what is now called the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). The former DHS
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Caryn Wagner (2010), testified to
Congress about the importance of this intelligence and information-sharing role with
partners at the state and local levels saying “It is our job to meaningfully convert what
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may appear to be bits of unrelated information into a product that helps protect our
communities…via a robust network of intelligence and law enforcement agencies
participating in state and local fusion centers” (p. 3). Within this support component of
DHS Headquarters is a State and Local Program Office (SLPO) and for the Office of
Intelligence and Analysis itself,
I&A has a unique mandate within the Intelligence Community and is the federal
government lead for sharing information and intelligence with state, local, tribal
and territorial governments and the private sector. It is these nonfederal partners
who now lead the Homeland Security Enterprise in preventing and responding to
evolving threats to the homeland (U.S. DHS, 2015a, para. 9).
Former Secretary of Homeland Security Napolitano (2011) stated that, “DHS is
intent on helping these fusion centers to develop their core capabilities to share and
analyze information and to provide state and local law enforcement with useful,
actionable information they can use to better protect their own communities” (p. 7).
Former Under Secretary Wagner (2010) also described the establishment and importance
of the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN), providing Secret-level intelligence and
information capabilities to state and local partners, at fusion centers, and “This
burgeoning network greatly expands two-way information-sharing flows between federal
and nonfederal homeland security partners” (pp. 3-4). DHS has strived to make major
improvement over the information-sharing infrastructure since virtually none existed
before 9/11. However, there is still much room for improvement.
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Obstacles to Domestic Interagency Information-sharing
Although the PATRIOT Act removed many obstacles that obstructed effective
sharing of terrorism information between agencies, many other challenges remain. Some
of these include organizational cultures, information technology, and other existing
statutes that prohibit or impede effective interagency sharing (Sales, 2010). The
PATRIOT Act and subsequent Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) adjustments
did make it easier to share terrorism information between and among federal law
enforcement agencies and the intelligence community, but it did not change the differing
cultures that remain within respective agencies (Best, 2011). Organizational cultures and
established practices remain a barrier to information-sharing between agencies. Olson
(2008) discussed that law enforcement officials reluctantly share information among
themselves let alone outsiders, “and the importance of protecting sources and methods
within the intelligence community means that there are limits on how far any intelligence
organization will go to share data” (p. 225-226).
The 9/11 Commission Report called for unity of effort in info sharing and stated,
“The biggest impediment to all-source analysis--to a greater likelihood of connecting the
dots--is the human or systematic resistance to sharing information” (Kean & Hamilton,
2004, p. 416). As the 9/11 Commission identified these gaps in terrorism informationsharing, they found insufficient mechanisms for effective sharing. The Commissioners
also encountered traditional views that either everyone is responsible for informationsharing; or that it is up to intelligence workers themselves to decide whether they share
information, resulting in “a ‘wait-and-see’ attitude in sharing information” (De Bruijn,
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2006, p. 270). The many different organizational cultures and the interpersonal skills of
the individuals involved remains a significant variable in interagency relations (Waugh &
Streib, 2006). The 9/11Commission Report specifically mentioned these agency cultural
and interagency procedural dysfunctions as contributing factors in the U.S. government
not preventing the 2001 terrorist attacks and they subsequently advocated for a change
from the ‘need to know’ concept to a ‘duty to share’ mentality (Kean & Hamilton, 2004).
In relation to information technology impeding information-sharing, the former
director of the Defense Intelligence Agency mentioned the difficulties of sharing when
each agency operates their own information technology systems, which generally means
agencies cannot access each other’s data (Jacoby, 2002). James Clapper, the former
Director of National Intelligence, declared during his confirmation hearing that he was
“aghast at the state of information technology across the community, wondering why
there's no single major combating-terrorism database with a robust search capacity
instead of 50 some odd databases with varying degrees of technological sophistication”
(Ambinder, 2010, para 3). While there have been great improvements in the area since
9/11, no optimal technological mechanism for intelligence sharing has been implemented.
In effect this makes most information-sharing a process of personal interactions
between officials from different agencies. This generally requires a physical location
where multiple agencies can exchange terrorism information, such as the National
Counter Terrorism Center or NCTC was created to do (Best, 2010). Michael Leiter
(2011), a former director of the NCTC, testified to Congress that interagency terrorism
information-sharing has improved but “complex legal, policy, and technical issues as
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well as the implementation of appropriate privacy, civil liberty, and security protections”
still limits effective data sharing (pp. 6-7).
Other significant obstacles to effective counterterrorism include many remaining
laws that prohibits or impede terrorism information-sharing between agencies. While the
PATRIOT Act assisted in specifically allowing the sharing of information between some
law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies, it did not remove all of the
impediments to effective domestic combating-terrorism. Significant obstacles remain for
protecting citizens from determined terrorists such as agency cultures, incompatible and
firewalled information technologies, and other laws that remain in effect. As Davis and
Kayyem (2014) have written, “Often there are antiquated and bureaucratic barriers to
information-sharing that serve no purpose and hinder the capacity of government to
interpret different pieces of data from different sources” (paras. 3-5).
Some of the difficulties in sharing information among these numerous actors
include the many overlapping laws, legal authorities, and differing capabilities between
all three levels of government and the several agencies that have some role in terrorism
(Imperial, 2005; Eack, 2008). Unfortunately, significant laws remain which prohibits or
impedes terrorism information-sharing between agencies. Sales (2010) described some of
these remaining statutory restrictions on information-sharing as the National Security Act
of 1947 which bars the CIA from internal security functions and could prevent the CIA
from sharing with federal law enforcement officials, the Posse Comitatus Act, which may
prevent the Armed Forces from sharing information with domestic authorities. Sales
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(2010) further states that the Privacy Act of 1974 which promotes individual privacy can
also be a barrier since a
restrictive reading of the Act…could prevent, for example, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (Customs) from sharing data about arriving container ships
with National Security Agency (NSA) officials who want to exploit it to screen
for terrorist stowaways (pp. 1797-1798).
Pappas (2010) conducted a study about the condition of domestic terrorism
information-sharing after 9/11 reforms, and found that agencies still fail to effectively
share information and concluded that “it is clear that the change that was expected when
enacting these laws has failed in many regards” (p. 15). A recent survey of key fusion
center leaders across the country also found that they were not very satisfied with
information-sharing (Carter, Carter, Chermak, & McGarrell, 2016). Despite the
expansion of JTTFs, and the proliferation of fusion centers, “the United States still lacks
a coherent national domestic intelligence collection effort” (Jenkins, 2011, p. 6). To find
recent examples of failures in counterterrorism information-sharing within the United
States, one need look no further than the terrorist attacks at Fort Hood and Boston.
Information-sharing Lapses at Fort Hood and Boston
Two post-9/11 events that could potentially have been prevented if more
information been shared with relevant partners include the 2009 Fort Hood shooting by
Army Major Nidal Hasan, and the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013 by the Tsarnaev
brothers. In the case of Fort Hood, the FBI did not share with the military or with state
and local officials in Texas that Major Hasan was making repeated email
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communications with a known key al Qaeda figure in Yemen (Filler, 2010; Verton, 2011;
Webster, 2012; Zegart, 2015). Had Hasan’s military supervisors, counter-intelligence
agents, or local officials been informed of this extremist activity, it is possible that other
pieces of the puzzle could have been assembled to stop the attack (McCaul & Keating,
2014; Shane & Johnston, 2009; United States Senate Report, 2011).
In regard to the Boston Marathon bombings, a sole FBI Agent in the Boston JTTF
looked into a report from Russia that Tamerlan Tsarnaev was a radicalized jihadist, but
he did not share this information with anyone from state and local agencies (including
those who were members of his own counterterrorism squad in the JTTF), or with either
of the fusion centers—Boston Regional or Massachusetts (Bender & Bierman, 2014;
Bodden, 2014; Davis & Kayyem, 2014; Etzioni, 2013; Evans, 2013; Inspector Generals,
2014; Reilly, 2013; Stokes, 2013). Had information been shared with local officials, even
those local detectives from Boston within the JTTF, it is very possible that Tsarnaev
could have been linked to two recent murders, or his later travel to Chechnya flagged and
the attack potentially disrupted (McCaul & King, 2014; Viser, 2013; Zalkind, 2014). It is
easy to second guess post facto, but the combined Inspector Generals of the Intelligence
Community, the Department of Justice and the CIA stated it should have been shared
with state and local officials (Inspector Generals, 2014).
Again, hindsight is always 20/20, but in both of the cases of Fort Hood and
Boston, had this intelligence of a terrorist nature on Hasan and Tsarnaev been shared with
appropriately cleared state and local officials, it is possible that the significant additional
suspicious activity of these soon to be terrorists (that was not known or observed by the
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FBI) could have all been collated with this federal intelligence and resulted in disrupting
the attacks and many lives saved (Kranish, M., Bender, B., Murphy, S. P., & Bierman,
N., 2013). Just as with 9/11, if state and local officials had known what federal law
enforcement and intelligence agencies had known, then routine encounters with local law
enforcement could have made the difference between life and death for unsuspecting
innocent citizens.
Fusion Centers and Information-sharing
An essential element of any fusion center is the ability to receive intelligence and
information. The DHS 2014 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report states,
As focal points for the receipt, analysis, gathering, and dissemination of threatrelated information between state, local, tribal, and territorial governments and the
private sector, fusion centers are uniquely situated to provide critical information
and subject matter expertise that allow federal law enforcement partners and the
Intelligence Community (IC) to more effectively “connect the dots” and protect
the homeland. (DHS, 2015b, p. iii)
It is important to note that information-sharing occurs on the top half of the
vertical plane between federal and state entities, as well as horizontal sharing between
multiple states and urban areas. These fusion centers can also become hubs for
collaborative operations to “detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and
terrorist activity” (Larence, 2008, p. 1). Sharing also occurs on the bottom half of the
vertical plane where fusion centers disseminate to customers like state troopers, and well
as receive reports from patrol officers and the public. Clearly, “A core purpose of a
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fusion center is to facilitate the sharing of information across law enforcement and other
public safety and private entities. Yet, information-sharing is one of the biggest obstacles
to be overcome” (Teutsch, 2010).
The Department of Justice and Department of Homeland security baseline
capabilities for fusion centers and the annual evaluation of them address as the first
critical operating capability or COC as the receiving of information or intelligence to
provide stakeholders with an accurate threat picture, outlined in these 5 factors:
COC 1 – Receive
1. Fusion center has approved plans, policies, or standard operating procedures
(SOPs) for the receipt of federally-generated threat information
2. Fusion center has a plan, policy, or SOP that addresses the receipt and handling
of National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) alerts
3. Fusion center personnel with a need to access classified information are cleared
to at least the Secret level
4. Fusion center has access to sensitive but unclassified information systems
5. Fusion center has access to HSDN and/or FBINet (i.e. within fusion center or
on-site). (2015 Annual Assessment, 2016, p. 20).
Fusion centers have improved significantly since 9/11 when the expansion began
in earnest. DHS reported in January 2015 that the National Network of fusion centers
continues to make progress and for the first time “all fusion centers have plans, policies,
or standard operating procedures for all four Critical Operational Capabilities (COC)”
(DHS, 2015b, p. iv). However, each fusion center is unique, and as has often been stated
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at National Fusion Center Association events, “if you have seen one fusion center you
have seen one fusion center” (Abold, Guidetti, & Keyer, 2012, p. 2). Since “no neat lines
divide criminal and terrorist activities. This shows why fusion centers are so vital in
helping agencies gain a more comprehensive picture of the threats they face” (Johnson,
2007, p. 29).
The problem is that these centers require information and intelligence to fuse. If
agencies do not share, they are very limited in what they can analyze and warn state and
local officials on. In early 2016 testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the California Governors’ Homeland
Security Advisor discussed improvements in information-sharing, but also described the
less than optimal present condition. “While there exist significant improvements in
collaboration and relationships among responders, there remains an overall lack of a
comprehensive ‘unity of effort’ in our information-sharing environment” (Ghilarducci,
2016, p. 4). Further, the Business Executives for National Security reported in March
2016 that “information-sharing initiatives are frequently sub-optimized…MORE MUST
BE DONE to institutionalize effective information-sharing programs between federal,
state, and local partners, and to formalize the real-time sharing processes” (Barron,
Lewis, Silberstein, & Shapiro, 2016, pp. 7-8).
A few studies have examined fusion centers and information-sharing such as
Carter, Carter, Chermak and McGarrell (2016), Joyal (2012), Carabin (2011) and Graphia
(2010). However, no studies have looked specifically at classified intelligence sharing,
and none have singled out the sharing of intelligence from federal agencies down to state
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and local fusion centers. Additionally, none of these studies have specifically addressed
the sharing of intelligence for the purpose of countering domestic terrorism.
The studies that have asked research questions related to information-sharing only
studied the concept of sharing in the most general sense. No study has completely
factored in the many different ways and directions that fusion centers share, nor the many
different categories of what information and intelligence is shared. For example, fusion
centers share internally, externally, vertically, horizontally, and receive and transmit all
types of information (data, information, and intelligence). The above mentioned previous
research does not specify what exactly is meant by studying information-sharing in
regard to fusion centers, nor do they specify if they are addressing intra-agency sharing or
inter-agency sharing.
Taking the risk of oversimplify a highly complex sharing environment, figure #2
attempts to depict some of the many different directions and partners that fusion centers
share with, both internally and externally. This graphic depiction highlights the focus of
this research by placing sensitive intelligence sharing on terrorism from federal agencies
to a hypothetical state fusion center as bold blue arrows.
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Figure 2. Sharing with and within a fusion center.
Fusion Centers and JTTFs
As previously mentioned in this chapter, a recent government commission
investigating FBI practices found that many still view sharing with the FBI as a “one way
street” and that means information goes to the FBI, not back out to partners (Hoffman,
Meese & Roemer, 2015). On the other hand, some in the FBI feel that DHS sponsored
fusion centers are misapplied and an inappropriate “diversion of critical resources and
manpower” that should instead be allocated to the FBI for domestic counterterrorism
(Verton, 2011, para 9). Some have described the FBI view as “an insurgent-like
resistance to share certain streams of information with fusion centers and their main DHS
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interface – the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) – due to the fact that active
investigations have been compromised” (Verton, 2011, para 11).
In some instances, there has been effective FBI JTTF and fusion center
information-sharing, but this has mainly been due to constructive personal relationships
built between specific individuals within respective agencies that grew over time at
certain locations (Apuzzo & Goldman, 2013). A core role now for each fusion center is to
function as “a nerve center for all calls coming into the statewide terrorism tip line. Those
with a suspected nexus to terrorism are forwarded to the JTTF for further investigation”
(Johnson, 2007, p. 30). However, recent studies have shown the relationships between
fusion centers and JTTFs are not necessarily healthy and effective (Carter, Carter,
Chermak, & McGarrell. 2016; Mayer, 2016; Mitchiner, 2013).
Numerous studies and Congressional reports have described how the overlap
between fusion centers and JTTFs was not well planned or deconflicted (Larence, 2008a;
McCaul & King, 2013; Rollins, 2008 ). Since there is no overall plan or standard template
for a JTTF or fusion center, this can “lead to duplication of effort and competition for
mission and related resources” (Tromblay, 2015, p.141). As Filler (2010) has written,
State and regional intelligence fusion centers have evolved significantly as a place
to pool multiple sources of intelligence within a region, but the next level of
integration, such as between the FBI’s Field Intelligence Groups, Joint Terrorism
Task Forces, fusion center analysts and local law enforcement remains unmet.
Nor has a construct outlining how fusion centers across the country should
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interoperate within a larger domestic intelligence framework been developed.
(para. 13)
The literature is clear that both fusion centers and interagency information-sharing
have improved markedly since 9/11. However, the literature also identifies many
interagency information-sharing obstacles and deficiencies. An appropriate theoretical
framework to evaluate these phenomena is the Dawes (1996) model of interagency
information-sharing to identify the benefits and barriers. No empirical research into how
federal agencies share sensitive domestic counterterrorism intelligence with state and
local officials through fusion centers exists, nor has this theoretical framework been
employed to study fusion centers.
Summary
While improvements certainly have been made with interagency informationsharing, there are many issues that still need to be studied and analyzed for improvement.
As this chapter addressed, fusion centers can and should serve a key role in domestic
counterterrorism. The FBI cannot do it alone, and the state and local agencies have
significant capabilities and the Constitutional responsibility to protect their citizens.
While much has been written about fusion centers, none have empirically researched the
issue of federal agencies sharing counterterrorism intelligence with subfederal fusion
centers. All three levels of government have a true ‘duty to share’ terrorism intelligence
to contribute to the collaborative effort that is necessary to stop both overseas terrorist
groups and homegrown extremists. In order to prevent more attacks like 9/11, Fort Hood,
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and Boston, it is essential to identify the key opportunities and obstacles to domestic
counterterrorism information-sharing at fusion centers.
This chapter examined the issues revolving around intelligence, the interagency
information-sharing failures, the challenges of domestic security in this federal
intergovernmental system, counterterrorism reforms, and the history and growth fusion
centers themselves. This chapter also identified the interorganizational knowledge
sharing theoretical framework upon which the proposed study is built, as well as the
domestic counterterrorism information-sharing challenges, the role of fusion centers and
information-sharing as well as this topic being a gap in the literature. Chapter 3 outlines
and discusses the methodology of this study, research questions, population, data analysis
procedures, instrumentation, and ethical considerations.
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology
Introduction
This chapter will outline the methodology used to examine the opportunities and
obstacles of federal counterterrorism information-sharing with state and local fusion
centers. Fusion centers are a rich topic for a qualitative, intergovernmental informationsharing research study. Each fusion center hosts various agencies from multiple levels of
government, all combined at one location, including representation of the federal
agencies themselves. The purpose of this study was to examine the opportunities and
obstacles of sharing federal counterterrorism information with state and local fusion
centers. This research advances the understanding of aspects of public policy as it relates
to homeland security and fill an important gap in the literature on information-sharing to
combat terrorism. Specifically, how effective does the state and local fusion center model
provides for federal agency intelligence and information-sharing with state and local
partners on terrorist threats.
This chapter covers the following topics: methodology, research questions, role of
the researcher, data collection, selection of participants, interview protocol, data analysis,
ethical considerations, and credibility and reliability.
Research Design
I used a qualitative case study to examine how federal agencies share information
and intelligence with fusion centers on terrorist threats that are likely impact their
jurisdictions. With this empirical and pragmatic methodology, I was able to reach
practitioners in their own setting and to examine, in depth, how the agencies interact
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(Yin, 2009; Stake, 1995). Case study research offers the chance to explore a narrow topic
based on multiple sources within the context of the phenomenon (Baškarada, 2014;
Hancock & Algozzine, 2006).
Based on Yin’s (2003) suggestions, I examined documents and records; the focus,
however, was on interviews of experts working in a fusion center. Thus, interviews of
individuals from different agencies at five fusion centers provided multiple perspectives
on the subject and yielded the data needed to answer the following research questions:
1. How effectively are fusion centers fulfilling their intended purpose of
improving homeland security by receiving terrorism information and
intelligence from federal agencies?
2. What are the opportunities in, or benefits of, federal counterterrorism
intelligence sharing with fusion centers?
3. What are the obstacles or barriers to federal counterterrorism intelligence
sharing with fusion centers?
Site Selection, Sampling Size, and Participants
This selected research design employed an exploratory case study analysis of five
state and local level fusion centers in the East Coast region of the United States. Any
region of the country can provide an appropriate sampling of fusion centers, however
most of the major al Qaeda terrorist attacks and attempts since the 1990s have been on
the East Coast (Mayer, Carafano & Zuckerman, 2011). Additionally, the East Coast of
the United States is the location of the national capitol where all these federal agencies
are headquartered. The proximity to the capitol makes it more likely to have participants
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in state and local fusion centers who will have interacted with federal officials, and they
may therefore know more about the opportunities and obstacles of interagency
information-sharing.
Site Selection and Sampling Size
Of the 78 total recognized fusion centers, there are 23 nonfederal fusion centers
across the 16 states on the East Coast of the United States and every state in the East has
at least one fusion center. Two of these East Coast states have three fusion centers (one
for the state and two regional fusion centers), and two states have two fusion centers (one
for the state and one major urban area). The East Coast is also home to the nation’s
capital, and there is a regional fusion center supporting the District of Columbia.
Researching 5 fusion centers therefore entails 22% of the total East Coast fusion centers.
Fusion center sites were selected for research based upon criteria to ensure
different locations were visited to offer various perspectives from across the spectrum of
jurisdictional and regional environments. This included researching fusion centers in the
south as well as those from the north of the country, as well as both large and small states
were selected. Fusion centers from both the state level and local/regional levels were
proportionally selected. Of the 78 nonfederal fusion centers, there are currently 53 state
level (68%) and 25 major urban area (32%) fusion centers spread throughout the country,
so this study therefore researched 3 at the state level (60%), and 2 fusion centers for
major urban areas (40%) (Carter, Carter, Chermak & McGarrell, 2016).
Fusion center research sites were further selected from across the spectrum of the
three principal functions (or types) fusion centers as described by Wight (2015),
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including those that are investigative in focus, centers that are principally analytical, and
those with a watch function. This sampling of 5 fusion centers also includes two major
U.S. cities with a significant critical infrastructure and regional importance. A major
urban area presents a frequent target of terrorists with high value, so these fusion centers
serve as a critical example of information-sharing where “if it doesn't happen there, it
won’t happen anywhere” (Patton, 2002, p. 236).
An additional factor for site selection criterion was that the fusion center director
or even higher government official had to approve researching their fusion center. This
was a significant challenge due to the sensitive nature of ongoing domestic
counterterrorism operations as well as the significant controversy still surrounding fusion
centers by some detractors in Congress and the private sector (German & Stanley, 2007;
Levin & Coburn, 2012). Additionally, this research was not government sponsored,
without compensation, and completely voluntary for both the centers and individual
participants. Further, a recent fusion center researcher had sullied the potential participant
pool by conducting interviews and then writing up very negative finding and naming the
centers visited in the process (McQuade, 2016). Not every fusion center that was
approached agreed to participate, so the next center on the list was approached based
upon the criteria until all 5 were completed. During the recruiting process it was vital to
assure both the leadership of prospective fusion centers and individual participants that
confidentiality and anonymity would be maintained.
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Participants
Interviews were conducted with 4-5 officials or analysts performing various roles
and representing different agencies at each of the participating fusion center sites. All
participants were identified as those with insider access, and only individuals who
actually work within the fusion center itself were interviewed. Individuals targeted for
interviews at each fusion center included personnel in the following positions: Fusion
Center Director or Deputy; Fusion Center Intelligence Analyst; DHS Intelligence
Officer/Reports Officer; FBI Special Agent or FBI Intelligence Analyst (or liaison to the
fusion center); as well as analysts or other officials assigned to the fusion center from
other federal, state, or local agencies. Only fusion centers that are formally recognized by
both DHS and the National Fusion Center Association (NFCA) at the time of data
collection were considered. Contact information for each fusion center is publicly
available both on the DHS website (https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-andcontact-information) and the NFCA website (https://nfcausa.org/default.aspx/MenuItem
ID/117/MenuGroup/Public+Home.htm).
Interviews
King (1994) states the goal of a qualitative research interview is to “see the
research topic from the perspective of the interviewee, and to understand how and why he
or she comes to have this particular perspective” (p. 14). To effectively interview
personnel in fusion centers, this research employed a hybrid approach that included both
a structured interview with the same questions asked of each participant at each center, as
well as time for an open-ended discussion about information-sharing issues. Patton
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(2002) describes this as a combined approach where one employs a “standardized format
by specifying certain key questions exactly as they must be asked while leaving other
items as topics to be explored at the interviewer’s discretion” (p. 347).
These voluntary interviews were conducted either in person or telephonically, and
were designed to highlight the various perspectives from different individuals
representing many different agencies and separate fusion centers. In-person ‘face to face’
interviews are preferred, but telephone interviews may be employed. Each interview
lasted approximately 30 minutes, with the participants being asked both specified and
open-ended questions. This does not count the time spent in discussions with fusion
center personnel before and after the interviews discussing information-sharing and
touring the facilities. Appendix A includes the list interview questions which were
derived from the research questions and the theoretical framework of Dawes (1996)
interagency information-sharing.
Data Collection and Analysis
The data were primarily collected during site visits and interviews as described
above. The interviews were recorded and the notes and recordings were transcribed for
analysis. Participants were also offered the opportunity to provide input at the end of the
interview to ensure their perspectives were accurately recorded and to ask questions of
the researcher. The assembled data from interviews was analyzed for word trends and
themes using NVivo qualitative data analysis software (NVivo v11). This software is
specifically designed for unstructured qualitative data, and it assisted in processing and
categorizing the information using an “open” coding method (Bazeley, 2012). This
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malleable method enables the researcher to code without many restrictions in order to
effectively identify patterns in the research.
The open coding method is appropriate for conducting exploratory research such
as this, as it allows the researcher additional flexibility for discovery. The analysis of the
text based qualitative data using NVivo also provided results such as word frequency and
as well as comparisons by job function, agency, location (Bazeley, & Jackson, 2013).
Some anticipated themes for obstacles to interagency information-sharing included
bureaucracy, personalities, compartmentalization, fear of leaks, and ownership. Through
this data collection on fusion centers and subsequent analysis, this study identified both
opportunities and obstacles to intelligence and information-sharing from federal agencies
to state and local officials.
Role of the Researcher, Bias Mitigation and Validity
Qualitative research is interpretive and involves the researcher interacting with
participants to study their experiences and perceptions and that the researcher should also
provide their own background and past experiences (Maxwell, 2012). A researcher
experienced in the field of study can be an advantage when it comes to having credibility
with the participants and may also facilitate gaining entry and permission to research on
site. However, researcher experience in the field can also have pitfalls that need to be
overcome such as bias and preconceived notions.
I personally brought many years of experience working in the Intelligence field as
well as being a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel to the project. I also have been a
member of a military fusion center in a war zone that brought together many different
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agencies in order to combat terrorism. During the research, I also served as a University
Assistant Professor of Homeland Security. While I have not worked in a domestic fusion
center, and have no relationships with any of them, my experiences and titles did assist in
getting permission from fusion centers to conduct research. This also provided credibility
as a researcher with the participants as a fellow practitioner. However, these experiences
also shaped my views, and this potential bias needed to be mitigated.
In an effort to reduce and mitigate experiential bias, steps were taken to ensure
my personal views and perceptions did not influence or compromise the study. The first
step was to state that there is no conflict of interest with this study, I had no personal
interest in the results of the study—either professionally or financially (Maxwell, 2012).
This research was purely for academic inquiry and solely about a topic I am interested in
learning more about in order to assist in closing the gap in the literature. I had no
preconceived notions about what the findings will be and am open minded and willing to
take the research where it leads – not lead the research based on any preexisting ideas.
The next step to ensure bias was not interjected into the research was the
dissertation committee itself. One of the roles of dissertation committee members is to
hold the researcher accountable to the scientific method make sure bias is not interjected
into the study (Miles & Huberman, 1994). This was accomplished during periodic
dissertation reviews, updates with the dissertation chair, and during oral defenses.
The validity, credibility, and confirmability of the research was ensured through
employing multiple strategies to maintain the high standards of quality and integrity.
These strategies included variation in participant selection, reflexivity, and dissertation
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committee review (Anney, 2014). Participant variation was employed by ensuring that
interviewees come from varying positions within fusion centers such as interviewing
individuals from the upper-level leadership, from mid-level leaders, and with those doing
most of the work such as investigators and analysts. Reflexivity was employed by using a
field journal for “creating transparency in the research process, and explore the impact of
critical self-reflection (Ortlipp, 2008, p. 695). Also, the open coding results will be
specified in Chapter 4 to ensure that another researcher can duplicate this study and
achieve same results.
Ethical Protection and Confidentiality of Participants
This research involved interviews where participation was strictly voluntary and
completely anonymous. There was no solicitation of protected populations, and
participant employment at a highly secure fusion center made that possibility highly
unlikely. The identity of both the fusion center sites visited as well as the names of
individual participants will remain anonymous. No participant personal information such
as names or contact information was recorded. Anonymity is important to ensure that the
participants can share their experiences and perspectives freely without concern for
retribution or other implications.
Data collection methods and confidentiality were thoroughly explained to the
participants, as well as to the leadership at each fusion center in advance. The only
identifying information on participants that was recorded included: the type of fusion
center (state level or major urban area), the job function or role such as “Analyst” or
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“Federal Agency Liaison” and all data gathered in this study will be kept confidential. At
no time are individual participants or the identity of fusion centers researched disclosed.
Additionally, no research was conducted until approved by the Institutional
Review Board was secured. Walden University’s approval number for this study is 0718-16-0192667. Further, no research was undertaken until cooperation agreements for the
study were secured from fusion center leadership at each location. Before any participant
interviews, volunteers were briefed on the study and provided with informed consent
forms. The participants were not subjected to any risk, and they were given the
opportunity to ask questions, as well as the freedom decline participation at any time.
Data Storage
Data collected during this study were stored electronically on a passwordencrypted computer located in a secured area with monitored alarms. All notes from
interviews were transferred to text based electronic files. Any publicly available hard
copy materials provided by fusion centers were scanned in and retained as secure
electronic files, just as data collected during interviews. In accordance with the standard
University Institutional Review Board practices, all research documentation will be
maintained for a period five years and then destroyed.
Conclusion
The case study method provided an effective qualitative research approach that
allows for the study of this bounded issue of domestic counterterrorism informationsharing using interviews at multiple sites and of various agencies. Larence (2011) stated
that,
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The federal government recognizes that fusion centers represent a critical source
of local information about potential threats, including homegrown terrorism, and a
means to disseminate terrorism-related information and intelligence from federal
sources. DHS, which has a statutory lead for state and local informationsharing…has taken steps to partner with and leverage fusion centers. (p. 10)
Fusion centers are a major facet of the local efforts to protect the U.S. because the
“ability of local government agencies to effectively utilize technologies to share
information constitutes a critical element in nationwide efforts to fight terrorism”
(Akbulut, et al, 2009, p. 143). However, many barriers to effective information-sharing
exist and fusion centers “have not achieved fully integrated and reliable communication
and collaboration mechanisms” (Joyal, 2012, p.368). While some research on fusion
centers exists, Carter and Carter (2009) found “fusion centers are so new that there has
been no empirical assessment of their effectiveness” (p. 1336). This research contributes
to closing this gap in empirical research using a qualitative case study framework
consisting of expert interviews of fusion center personnel.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The research assessed how effectively fusion centers are fulfilling their intended
purpose: to improve homeland security by receiving terrorism information and
intelligence from federal agencies. Data on federal counterterrorism information-sharing
was collected through interviews conducted at five fusion centers on the East Coast of the
United States. This chapter presents the interview data gathered from the fusion centers,
including both state level and major urban areas; the chapter also presents the patterns,
research findings, and resulting analysis of the data.
Study Sample Process
Gaining access to fusion centers to collect data proved to be the most challenging
part of the research process. This was due to three reasons: (a) the sensitivity of the
intelligence and law enforcement work going on inside fusion centers, (b) the
controversial perceptions about domestic intelligence, and (c) recent interview-based
research in which negative findings were published, participants were directly named,
and the centers were shamed. This challenge was eventually overcome due to (a) my
experience as an intelligence professional, and the (b) relationships established with
personnel in fusion centers during the course of research. This study would have likely
ended with only two centers visited were it not for the direct intervention by some helpful
and interested fusion center directors and federal agency personnel who took a personal
interest in this study and assisted with outreach.
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After sending participation requests to fusion centers in the East Coast, the target
area, I was ultimately able to gain access to five centers that were willing to participate in
the study. As described in Chapter 2, this sampling included three state fusion centers and
two major urban areas. Researching 60% and 40%, they closely matched the national
percentages of 68% and 32% respectively for the ratio of fusion centers compared to state
and local centers. Two of the states were large and had multiple counties, multiple JTTFs,
and major urban areas; the third state was smaller.
Five personnel from each of the five centers were recruited for interviews, for a
total of 25 participants. Participation in the study was strictly voluntary and interviewees
were informed they could withdraw at any time during the process. However, all
volunteers fully participated in the process. Each answered all of the background
questions and all 12 interview questions. Participants included upper level management
such as directors and deputy directors, middle level management such as senior analysts
and federal agency representative, as well as those in nonsupervisory positions such as
analysts and investigators. All participants were actually working within a fusion center
at the time of data collection and came from various positions within each center.
From the five fusion centers participating in the study, I was able to recruit
personnel from agencies across all three levels of government spanning federal, state, and
local levels. Participants were specifically selected because they encompassed a variety
of backgrounds to include state and local law enforcement officers and investigators,
federal agents and intelligence officers, as well as intelligence analysts from state and
local agencies. At each fusion center I was able to interview at least one person from each
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of the three targeted sub-categories within each fusion center including senior leadership,
federal representatives, and intelligence analysts. These participants provided firsthand
knowledge directly related to federal level intelligence sharing with their respective
fusion center. It is for this reason that each of the participants from all three levels of
government and across this span of duties and responsibility levels were recruited to be
interviewed for this study.
Data Collection Method
Data collection occurred through interviews mainly conducted on-site and inperson with the 25 research participants conducted in August and September 2016. The
interviews were all performed in-private, one-on-one and recorded via an Olympus
digital recording device. This allowed for ease of transcription and facilitated the
researcher being able to actively listen to the answers. Four of the five fusion centers
were visited by the researcher to conduct face to face interviews, and one fusion center
was researched by conducting telephone interviews. Additionally, the researcher visited
two different fusion centers a few years earlier (one state and one regional) unrelated to
data collection. This offered the researcher an overall qualitative context of 6 total fusion
centers physically visited (four researched for this study) spanning from New England to
Florida, and only one site researched virtually/telephonically.
Each participant in the study was asked six background questions which provided
the needed data to identify the interviewee career field, position in the center, leadership
level and longevity. Twelve interview questions to ascertain their experiences and views
on federal counterterrorism information-sharing with their respective fusion center. Due
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to the sensitive and potentially controversial nature of this study, third parties were not
allowed to observe or listen to the interviews, which also ensured anonymity and that the
participants would feel free to express their opinions. Each fusion center and individual
participants were assured their identities would remain confidential and the study
findings would not attribute collected data to any location or specific person.
Additionally, the participants were advised during recruiting and informed consent
processes that the study would remain at the unclassified level and not get into technical
details involved with the information technology or systems involved in federal
intelligence sharing on terrorism.
As the researcher, I did not interject my personal views and opinions during the
interview process, and made a point to keep my expressions neutral as not to influence
the interviewee. This helped to ensure that participants answers were their own and not
influenced by any researcher opinions or biases. The duration of interviews ranged
between 20 and 50 minutes, with the average time close to the planned 30 minutes. The
variability between the interview length was mainly based on how much individual
participants wanted to talk about each question, as well as the participants’ experience
level with and passion about interagency information-sharing. Each participant provided
detailed responses on federal intelligence sharing with their fusion center, and their own
thoughts about the opportunities and obstacles for effective terrorism intelligence sharing.
By actually visiting four of the five centers researched, I was able to gain rich
context into fusion centers by conducting the research on-site. Not only was I able to
spend at least one day at each facility, visits to some centers spanned multiple days,
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which provided me with an opportunity to see those centers in operation. While I did not
participate in any analysis or closed door meetings, I did observe all the various
workspaces, offices, conference rooms as well as some interactions between analysts,
agents, investigators and fusion center leaders. This was further contextualized by my
own personal experiences serving in a military counterterrorism fusion center overseas.
Having context from my own fusion center experience coupled with observations of state
and local fusion centers in action assisted in framing recommendations for this research.
During discussions with these 25 participants, I learned indirectly about other
challenges and successes from other fusion centers that were mentioned in the interviews.
This is due to the national network of fusion centers being a network of networks where
directors, senior analysis and others are often in contact with one another (see Figure 2.
Sharing With and Within a fusion center). While the five fusion centers participating in
this research generally had very positive relationships with their corresponding JTTFs,
multiple participants mentioned accounts of dysfunctional relationships and a serious lack
of sharing from JTTFs. Collecting these examples of deep and rich data from participants
as well as observations could not have been gained from quantitative surveys or by solely
conducting telephone interviews.
Immediately after each interview, the recordings were reviewed and transcribed
into a Microsoft Word document. Each document was sorted by location and participant
number (Site A, B, etc and Participant 1, 2, etc). Additionally, each interview form
included the background information for further analysis such as position within the
fusion center, years at that center, leadership level, etc. (see Appendix A for the list of
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background questions). All interview files on participants were saved on a passwordencrypted computer and organized according to the fusion center site files. At the
conclusion of researching all five fusion centers, interview data was compiled and
analyzed.
Study Sample Description
The individuals targeted for interviews were those working in counterterrorism
related functions within the fusion centers, or secondarily those who could benefit from
federal intelligence sharing on terrorism threats. Based upon recruitment process and
background questioning, the composition of the 25 participants consisted of 11 law
enforcement professionals (44%) and 14 intelligence professionals (56%). The years of
experience of the participants in their respective career fields ranged from 1 to over 20
years, with the average being 14.4 years. See Table 3 on Study Participant Roles below,
and more details in Appendix B: Participant Background By Site and Totals.
Table 3
Study Participants by Fusion Center Role

Director/deputy director
Senior Intelligence Analyst
DHS representative
FBI representative
Detective or investigator
Intelligence/criminal analyst

Site A

Site B

Site C

Site D

Site E

Total

1
0
1
1
1
1

1
0
1
0
0
3

1
1
1
0
0
2

1
1
1
1
1
0

1
1
1
0
1
1

5
3
5
2
3
7
25

The study sample included five upper-level leaders with the director or deputy
director being interviewed at every fusion center (four directors and one deputy). Also,
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eight middle or lower level supervisors participated and 12 nonsupervisory personnel
giving the breakdown of 52% leadership and 48% non-leaders. The participants came
from all three levels of government with 7 from federal agencies (28%), ten from the
state level (40%) and eight from the local or city level (32%). The participants’ total
longevity of service in the fusion centers researched spanned from less than one to over
ten years, averaging out to 4.68 years for all participants. This is a significant amount of
time considering the frequency of rotating in fusion center personnel and the fact that
fusion centers have only become relatively mainstream since 2004. Interestingly, the
newest fusion center participant interviewed (less than a year) was a former New York
City Police Officer who previously worked in the famous NYPD Intelligence Division
and actively worked counterterrorism cases before moving to a new city and joining a
fusion center as an analyst.
At each fusion center the expressed goal was to interview a diverse set of only
five participants at each center for consistency of data. These individuals were targeted
based on their role in the center (directors, federal representatives, investigators, and
analysts) and across the spectrum of levels of government (federal, state, and local) as
well as leadership and non-leaders. For the seven federal representatives there was a DHS
representative at each center interviewed and only two from the FBI. This limited number
of FBI representatives interviewed also directly matched the limited amount of time FBI
personnel spend at fusion centers with most only being present about two days a week
and in one fusion center the FBI position was vacant. The FBI rarely assigns personnel to
a fusion center on a permanent basis, and most often conducting liaison with the fusion
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center is an additional duty on top of their primary position within a nearby FBI field
office or JTTF. All participants were actively working in a state or local fusion center at
the time of research. A few participants mentioned having worked in more than one
fusion center, although this was not a specific background question.
Interview Questions Background
The questions asked during the interview were derived from the three research
questions and solely focused on federal intelligence sharing with state and local fusion
centers on terrorist threats. The 12 interview questions, were primarily formed from the
Dawes (1996) interagency information-sharing theoretical framework and aligned to
focus on benefits and barriers to this intelligence sharing on terrorism with fusion centers
(for all 12 interview questions, see Appendix A). In accordance with Dawes theory the
questions were designed to give interviewees a framework to discuss their practitioners’
perspective on federal terrorism intelligence sharing with their fusion centers. The
emphasis was on identifying the benefits and opportunity of intelligence sharing with the
fusion center as well as specifying the barriers, obstacles and risks of the same specific
sharing dynamic. The questions were contextualized around terrorism intelligence as well
as the role the fusion center plays in countering terrorism. All of the participants seemed
to immediately comprehend the questions and a number of expert participants
commented afterward that the questions were very good and thought provoking.
Analysis of the Data
The data analysis occurred after the completion of all interviews and the
compiling of all transcripts into NVivo (version 11). All participant interviews were
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added into NVivo as “sources” and then categories as “cases” and given person
“attributes” to match the 6 background questions “classifications” by case. Then the
interview questions were added as “nodes” and the data were analyzed by each question
and through the aspect of each factor such as profession, role, longevity and type agency.
Through the analysis by interview question, it was apparent that explicit themes
as well as less obvious patterns were revealed in the interview data. There were also
trends and patterns revealed based upon background factors. Additionally, all 12
interview questions were subordinated to the three research questions and coded and
analyzed based upon the research questions focused on Dawes (1996) interagency
sharing theory.
Themes and patterns presented themselves collectively for all participants as well
as other trends based upon background factors such as: those participants in a leadership
position and longevity within a center, responses based on years of experience in the
career field, and responses based on position within the fusion center. However, there
were no patterns or differences between the various levels of leadership within fusion
center managers and supervisors (only differences between leaders vs non-leaders).
Collective Participant Responses to Federal Terrorism Intel Sharing Questions
For this research, the questions focused on gaining qualitative data on the
perceptions of federal counterterrorism information-sharing with theses nonfederal fusion
centers. This study focused on asking how well is the federal government sharing
terrorism intelligence with fusion centers, in what ways are they sharing it, what obstructs
sharing, and what could make this sharing more effective. The responses from all the
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participants collectively revealed clear trends in the interview data on these benefits and
barriers. However, some questions yielded a range of answers based additional factors,
such as differences between sites based upon the specific and distinct roles of different
fusion centers. The following represents a summary of the 12 questions and the thrusts of
the collective participant responses (henceforth referred to as P1-P25) with key excerpts
provided for each interview question as exemplars.
Q1. What role does your fusion center play in counterterrorism?
Participants from each of the fusion centers mentioned at least two aspects in
countering terrorism. The first role is receiving and vetting suspicious activity reports,
and the second is disseminating relevant terrorism bulletins and other products to those
who need it – mainly police and other first responders. Interestingly, this role in vetting
suspicious activity reports evolved over time as most fusion centers started before the
baseline capabilities came out in 2008 starting the formalization of suspicious activity
reporting (Department of Justice, 2008). A representative participant response was,
Here at this center, the major role played in terms of counterterrorism is the one
that is played in most centers across the country in the sense that suspicious
activity reports (SARs) that come in are vetted and…as soon as the SARs come in
and there's a potential for terrorism related behavior it automatically goes to the
JTTF and database checks are run at the state level at the local level based on the
fact that here in this state much of that information is available, the access that the
state analysts have here at the this center includes basically all the local law
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enforcement databases for the state and they're all kind of aggregated, so those
checks happen here.
Aside from these two consistent counterterrorism roles for all sites, there was a
range of additional responses to this question based upon the distinct missions of each
individual fusion center. The fusions centers that are purely analytical mentioned the
additional role of contextualizing federal reporting and other information into tailored
and meaningful products for their customers – not just passing on federal bulletins. One
example includes analyzing recent terrorist attacks overseas and in the United States to
support preparing police and emergency services to be able to detect and better respond if
similar attacks occur in their jurisdiction.
Some fusion centers also had additional counterterrorism responsibilities if the
center has an investigative role or an operational component with terrorism functions
under the fusion center director. For example, some fusion centers are not just analytical
but also have detectives or investigators to actively explore suspicious activity – normally
in coordination with the local JTTF. These fusion centers with more than analytical roles
have collection assets or sources they can task for intelligence purposes, which gives
them more of terrorism role than passively receiving federal intelligence or suspicious
activity reports from citizens. At least one fusion center also commanded an operational
law enforcement arm with an active counterterrorism related mission and had close
cooperation with federal law enforcement agencies. Also, some fusion centers have a
“watch” function where they monitor events using close circuit cameras or other live
reporting as well as coordinating response actions.
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Q2. How has receiving federal information and intelligence in your fusion center
been useful in countering terrorism?
Participants responded that federal information and intelligence on terrorist
threats was “invaluable” to their terrorism mission. A key role mentioned in interviews is
that receiving this federal intelligence allowed them to have situational awareness on
threats coming from overseas, as well as details of terrorist trends and patterns that they
otherwise would not be aware of. A participant response representative of this includes,
“We gain better understanding of the threats that we face, the kind of these things that are
happening both nationally and internationally and try to develop a vision of it being
replicated here within the state, which helps us mitigate threats.”
Participants in fusion centers with a focus on analysis were quick to mention how
this federal sharing provided them the ability to deliver valuable products to their
customers. Participants also mentioned how receiving this intelligence allowed them to
keep their stakeholders and policymakers informed about terrorism overall and the
specific terrorist threats to their jurisdiction. In fact, this reason was the original catalyst
for the growth of nonfederal fusion centers around the country after 9/11.
Receiving this federal intelligence allows fusion centers to have visibility into
terrorism threats from both the domestic and overseas fronts that they do not have
themselves. Multiple participants mentioned the vast and well-funded resources that that
federal government has at its disposal to address terrorism threats, which state and local
agencies do not have—nor are they resourced to build. Participants mentioned federal
agencies in the 17 member U.S. intelligence community, the many federal law
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enforcement agencies, as well as the many intelligence sources and databases at the
federal level. Although a few participants with a lot of fusion center experience noted that
receiving federal intelligence in fusion centers has not been as significant as initially
thought it would be, which may also partially explain the evolution of most fusion centers
from primarily terrorism to an all-crimes, all-hazards focus.
Q3.

What are the opportunities or benefits of federal Counter Terrorism (CT)

info/intel sharing with fusion centers?
This question was answered in various ways depending upon the participant’s role
in the fusion center, as well as the mission of the fusion center at each particular site. The
most notable responses were along the lines of the overall cause for fusion centers to
rapidly expand in the mid-2000s in the first place – that sharing federal intelligence with
state and local officials can help prevent terrorist attacks such as 9/11. Multiple
practitioners mentioned how sharing with a fusion center can better ensure state and local
police are able to be on the lookout for specific activities when it comes to terrorism. This
is a benefit to everyone from the federal level down to the local levels, and even citizens
themselves. to be able to fill in those gaps that we would never otherwise be able to fill.
Question 3 also generated interesting discussions about different roles in domestic
counterterrorism as well as which agencies benefit from interagency sharing. The
question was originally intended to elicit views about how this top down sharing benefits
the nonfederal fusion centers who receive the intelligence, which many participants
emphasized. However, this question elicited responses describing many other benefits
within and without the fusion center, addressing all 360 degrees (see Figure 2 on the
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directions of sharing within and with fusion centers). Multiple participants explained that
fusion centers greatly benefited from the sharing, but that federal agencies such as the
FBI benefited as well since fusion centers generally focus on analysis and dissemination
while JTTFs focus on investigations and disruptions of terrorist plots. For example, many
participants discussed the rise in homegrown terrorism and the difficulty in identifying
those on the path to radicalization. By sharing with fusion centers the federal government
is extending their network and making it increasingly capable of informing those with the
ability to get the word out and to educate people on what to report using resources like as
the 18,000 fusion liaison officers around the country (Stewart, 2016).
A major benefit to fusion centers is the ability to leverage the massive resources
federal agencies have that fusion centers do not have. The most significant benefit to
sharing with fusion centers is the ability to collaborate and pool resources in order to
support counter terrorism in their jurisdiction. While federal intelligence and law
enforcement agencies are well funded and they have a lot of capabilities and databases,
they are also stretched very thin domestically. One participant response highlighting this
point was,
Obviously the federal government has a lot more resources and they have
confidential informants and all these are other resources that we don't have, so we
can leverage those resources that as a local government agency we would never
be able to afford or commit our resources to and bring that to bear on the threats
and the hazards that we have here in the region. So having that connection is
really important.

103
Q4.

What are the obstacles or barriers of federal CT info/intel sharing with

fusion centers?
More than half of the participants answered this question by first mentioning
multiple obstacles to sharing stemming from aspects of the sensitive and classified nature
of federal terrorism intelligence. While, these practitioners clearly recognized the need to
keep this sensitive information within appropriate channels and only to those possessing
security clearances, there were still many existing barriers regarding secrecy. The main
barrier mentioned by the vast majority of participants is that receiving this classified
federal terrorism intelligence in the fusion center does them little practical good when
they cannot share it with those they feel most need it – patrol officers and other customers
who do not have any security clearances. Participants discussed that even when they
receive this sensitive intelligence, they are not authorized to extract or reword any
classified information from the reports to disseminate it to others who need it even for
their awareness. A representative participant response was,
I would just say the one that stands out to me is just the clearance issues, because
if you don't have a clearance you can’t get that information to attend a meeting
even, but then if you do, what do you do with that information if you're
stakeholders don’t have a clearance? So I have all this now but how do I apply
it—I can't share that.
Other obstacles to sharing with fusion centers include the technological and
physical components. Multiple participants discussed the great difficulty in getting access
to federal intelligence systems at the secret level, and the challenges in searching those
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systems for anything in their region. They also discussed the lack of content available on
the Secret level Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN) and state and local agencies
only have access to a very small portion of the entire federal government Secret level
databases. Another physical barrier to sharing is the fact that state and local officials are
not allowed to certify facilities or systems for secure operations, and everything is driven
by the slow federal bureaucracy. As a case in point, one fusion center visited was
operating completely at the unclassified level due to change in location many months
earlier. Multiple participants complained about the difficulty getting access to federal
classified systems and databases, and maintaining that access once granted.
Another obstacle is the lack of available intelligence products relevant for their
jurisdiction. An example provided was that NCTC has a site on HSDN but it is nearly
empty, the vast majority of terrorism intelligence at the federal level is above Secret and
not available on HSDN (or on the other sensitive but unclassified systems that fusion
centers can access). These federal intelligence reports either cannot be downgraded to the
secret only level, or NCTC and other agencies are just not sanitizing these reports to
make them available to state and local analysts in fusion centers.
One fusion center director stated that the main obstacle to effective intelligence
sharing for that particular center is the lack of Top Secret / Sensitive Compartmented
Information (TS/SCI) security clearances and TS/SCI facilities for fusion center analysts.
However, many other participants at multiple fusion centers were doubtful that more
sensitive information above the Secret level would even be useful to a state or regional
fusion center. As of this writing the DHS is currently under Congressional mandate to
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study the value of providing Top Secret clearances to officials in state and local fusion
centers (McCaul, 2015).
On this point, multiple participants highlighted the difficulty of utilizing of reports
shared with a fusion center at only the Secret level information, unless it had an
unclassified summary or “tearline” embodied within the report that could be shared with
partners who need to know but do not have a secret clearance. Very few ‘customers’ of
fusion center reporting and disseminated products have a Secret clearance, which is
another barrier mentioned by many participants. Fusion center participants generally
stated that all reporting and products from their center have to be unclassified.
Another barrier mentioned by participants involved the organizational cultures
and personality dependent aspects of intelligence sharing. While a number of fusion
centers studied currently have very good relationships with their corresponding JTTFs,
the participants made it clear that this was due in large part to the existing interpersonal
relationships between fusion center directors and JTTF supervisory special agents. It was
also highlighted by participants that the current senior leadership of the FBI and DHS
were pushing for increased interagency sharing to the lowest levels. However, this has
not always been the case, and there are still enduring negative perspectives about
intelligence sharing. Participants from each of the five sites mentioned that one barrier to
sharing is the view by some in federal agencies that state and local fusion centers are
either untrained or unable to either properly handle classified intelligence, or that they
would not know what to do with it. This was described by one participant as the “Barney
Fife” view of state and local agencies, and it is difficult to overcome.
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Multiple participants also discussed the often negative impact that the cultures of
different agencies and career fields have on effective sharing. For example, some law
enforcement professionals described how their career field holds an almost automatic
suspicion of those who do not carry a badge and a gun. It was specifically mentioned that
it took time to overcome this distrust and that a fusion center should not send an analyst
as a liaison or detailee to a law enforcement centric JTTF, but to send a law enforcement
professional.
Finally, one of the most impactful barriers mentioned by participants is the lack of
federal agency personnel actually working within fusion center. Participants at each
fusion center researched stated that the main sharing from the federal level comes from
the federal personnel working in or liaising with their fusion center. However, none were
satisfied with either the number of personnel present or the amount of time those assigned
from federal agencies were available to them in person. All 18 state and local participants
interviewed held their federal agency counterparts working with them in extremely high
regard. However, many feds working in their centers often had tasks requiring them to
travel outside of the fusion center, or they had to spend significant time in federal offices
not co-located with the fusion center. Multiple participants felt strongly that one
representative each from DHS and FBI was not enough to effectively support their fusion
center and some were seeking more embedded representatives. Interviewees mentioned
Congressional limits which limit the total number of DHS Intelligence Officers in fusion
centers, resulting in some centers losing their most important vehicle for intelligence
sharing (United States Congress, H.R.3503, 2015).
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Q5.

What can or should be done to remove or mitigate these obstacles,

barriers, and risks that impede effective sharing of federal terrorism information and
intelligence sharing with state and local fusion centers?
Most participants answered this question by directly addressing the barriers and
obstacles they listed for Question 4. One frequent suggestion by participants was to
increase the number of federal representatives in fusion centers. By embedding more
federal personnel it addressed almost every single barrier or obstacle mentioned by the
participants. For example, having more feds represented in the fusion center from DHS
and the FBI would increase the number of individuals who can knowledgeably access
federal systems and databases to look for what is relevant to their jurisdiction. This also
increases the number of people in the fusion center whom leaders, investigators, and
analysts can ask questions about terrorism issues and reports and also have more
representation from these agencies in meeting and other fusion center work. While it is
true that virtual sharing can occur over a computer or phone, it was made very clear by
the participants that the vast majority of sharing occurs in person and the thrust of
perceptions by participants was that “you can’t share if you are not there.” A response
representing this line was “I think maybe one way to remove these barriers it co-locating
people. So you have someone you know detailed to the JTTF and that helpful because
you're operating in a secure environment.”
Another example of how to remove or mitigate these barriers is to ensure that the
right people are selected for interagency exchanges. Instead of sending an intelligence
analyst to a JTTF, send a state or local law enforcement officer who would be much more
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likely to have information shared with them based upon the common bonds shared by
serving law enforcement professionals that are “in the club” than those outsiders. In fact,
the theme of establishing or building trust came up often.
Another way to overcome sharing obstacles mentioned by participants is
increasing the production of “tearline” reports from the Feds to state and local fusion
centers. These reports contain the essence of the threat information without the sensitive
sources and methods information at the top of the report that gets torn off and not shared.
One fusion center senior analyst mentioning knowing about tearlines and the process to
create one, but that the center had not received any. Federal terrorism information and
intelligence coming in is either classified and cannot be shared or unclassified and ready
for dissemination, but with no real value to analysts or their customers. General
information that the threat from terrorists is high during any particular period is not very
valuable to fusion centers and often is “watered down” to the point of being elementary
and almost pointless.
Q6.

Which federal intelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies share

info and intel on terrorism with your fusion center?
All 18 state and local participants answer this question by saying that DHS was
the number one and most consistent federal agency that shares with their fusion center.
DHS representatives themselves highlighted that sharing is a major role for DHS. Next
participants most frequently listed the FBI as the second federal agency sharing with their
center. Others federal agencies mentioned include the NCTC, CIA, ICE, ATF, DEA, the
Secret Service, and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). A representative fusion
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center participant response on these agencies was “The bulk of the information comes
from FBI and DHS So there may be some things that come from other agencies but it
would be typically be through the FBI or via DHS.”
This point on other federal agencies sharing through DHS or the FBI means most
federal agencies other than DHS and FBI that share with fusion centers generally do so
second hand. For example, NCTC databases are accessible via HSDN, not by having
NCTC personnel in a fusion center (at least in any center visited as a part of this study). If
I were to repeat this research I would clarify this question to ask “which agencies directly
share with your fusion center” and possibly ask an additional question about which
agency reports or databases are accessible to your center. Although asked about agency
sharing, some participants immediately personified organizational sharing by discussing
the individual agency representatives by name who shared the most with them in their
center. This further reinforced the point about most sharing is really about people and not
organizations or systems.
For these five east coast fusion centers there were some particularities of having
national borders within their jurisdictions. For example, these border region fusion
centers also mentioned interactions with DHS field agencies like the U.S. Coast Guard or
Customs and Border Protection, which may not likely be the case in the heartland of
America. Some of these federal agencies interacted directly with fusion center. As an
example, I was simultaneously visiting one center at the same time as HSI. Interestingly,
there is a legislative proposal in Congress at the time of this writing to study the value of
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placing representatives from these DHS border related agencies in state and local fusion
centers (McCaul, 2015).
Q7.

How would fusion centers be different if there was no sharing of federal

CT info/intel?
This question caused the most visceral reactions from participants with the clear
majority making comments that fusion centers would “die on the vine” or be “dead in the
water” without this federal intelligence being shared with them. Additional representative
participant responses include “I think the fusion centers would cease to exist” and “We'd
be blind.” Some participants furthered commented that without this federal sharing it
ignores all the recent counterterrorism lessons learned and setback counterterrorism
efforts with representative responses including,
Actually going backwards compared to where we would be going back to 9/11
where you know the information's out there, dangling out there somewhere but
nobody is able to grab it and put pieces together make sure that all entities of law
enforcement whether it be at the federal state or local level are informed in order
to make decisions as far as the safety of the citizens of the U.S.
A minority of participants thought fusion centers would still continue, but that the
residual mission would only deal with average state and local crimes, and the federal
government would have to deal with terrorism threats by themselves. Example participant
responses along these lines includes “I think that over time you see a quick erosion of
anything even remotely related to national security focus and back down into community
your traditional criminal activity focus” and “We would just be a crime center.”
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Some participants commented that without federal intel their stakeholders and
customers would be without this reporting, or policymakers would have to go directly to
feds to get intelligence terrorism threats without the benefit of state and local context. No
participants reacted in a positive way to this question or felt it was a good idea. It was
clear that almost all saw the lack of federal sharing on terrorism threats as the death knell
for fusion centers and that neither JTTFs nor the FBI can do it alone.
Q8.

How would fusion centers be different if they had extensive access and

sharing of federal CT info/intel?
This answer generated a spectrum of responses that spanned from those who felt
there would be little difference to those who saw this hypothetical future as revolutionary.
The few participants who felt there would be little difference for fusion centers were
generally the same participants who feel that their fusion center already receives this type
of information. However, participants also felt that if this extensive and detailed
intelligence were available to fusion centers it would require significantly more resources
and time to integrate that information. As it stands now, fusion centers mainly have
access to their own state and local systems and databases, and a very small amount of
federal intelligence at the secret level. However, if the vast amounts of federal
intelligence were accessible, there is not enough time to search, nor enough analysts to
access it all. A representative response for this question was “There are limited resources
we have a limited number of people and even if opened-up the floodgates I don't think
there's enough hours in the day and number of people to be fully explore all that
information.”
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Additionally, very few personnel in fusion centers have security clearance above
the secret level that would allow them access to this intelligence even if systems were in
place to do so. Some participants again raised the point about the difficulty of using any
relevant intelligence they did find if they had access to this Top Secret information. An
interesting participant response to this question was,
There's absolutely nothing that you can do with that information, because when
you're going to the Top Secret level you're talking about methods of collection.
You're talking about how the information was collected” and “we don't need to
know source details we just need to know there's a threat and the details of the
threat but we don't need to know like the sourcing of it. So I think it's a good thing
that they don't we don't have access to go in to into the databases just kind of like
at our own will.
Interestingly, most of the experienced participants were firm in their opinion that
they do not want this level or depth of access to massive federal intelligence databases.
The practitioners with the most fusion center experience and career longevity stated they
would prefer to instead have more federal personnel embedded with them who can access
these federal systems and tell them what they need to know, not try to search for what
they think they need themselves. A representative response along these lines was “Instead
of having deep access I’d rather have an extra FBI analyst… I mean I’d rather have a
body here. You know be able to tap into that.”
All participants were cognizant that having access to these federal intelligence
databases an FBI case files would require a lot more resources than what they currently
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have, and that it would be a significant risk to have so many people exposed regularly to
this sensitive intelligence (nor do they have facilities or systems above secret anyway). A
number of participants also commented that they have no practical use for this
intelligence anyway since they cannot integrate it into their products or share it with any
of their customers (many of which do not even have a Secret clearance).
Q9.

Should federal security agencies share info/intel with fusion centers or

should they share with a different organization in your jurisdiction (such as a JTTF)?
This question generated mainly straightforward answers that this intelligence
should definitely come into the fusion center in some form. Participants noted that it is a
critical role of a fusion center to disseminate terrorism information to lowest possible
levels of first responders, but they cannot fulfill this role if intelligence was not shared
with them to do so. A concise participant response on this point was “All the federal, like
high level information is being worked at the Top Secret level by federal agencies like
CIA, NSA, Homeland Security, FBI, and all of that information is sent down to local
JTTF offices…we might not get the full information because a lot of it is Top Secret.”
It was recognized that JTTFs are the lead investigative bodies in the U.S. for
investigating and countering terrorism, and that JTTFs are in receipt of this intelligence
already – as they should be. However, participants were united in the view that this
terrorism intelligence should also be shared with the fusion centers as well. As a result,
this question was most often answered with the response that terrorism intelligence
should go to both fusion centers and JTTFs. A representative participant response from a
fusion center senior intelligence analyst was:
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I feel that information should be shared with us. Lots of times we've not had that
issue, but I know in speaking with other fusion centers that's been a big problem if
it gets to the JTTF, you may or may not have a component on that JTTF that can
share that information with you as a fusion center, so I’m a proponent that
information be shared with the fusion center because basically that’s why fusion
centers were created in the first place, they are supposed to be that bridge.
The answers to this question also generated discussion on the different roles that
fusion centers play and their differences with JTTFs. Participants discussed their focus as
a center for vetting of suspicious activity reports which are then forwarded on to the
JTTF if they seemed credible or met certain criteria. However, non-leadership
participants made it clear that they rarely heard anything back from JTTFs, while fusion
center upper level leaders were periodically briefed on intelligence and ongoing
investigations.
Another representative participant response was “JTTFs have a lot of local and
state agencies collocated but I don't think they reach out to or have as many stakeholders
in their operation as we might. given our network of contacts around the region, so I think
it makes sense to share it with both. Some overlap but really different purposes.”
Interestingly, in a few of the fusion centers with the closest relationships with their
respective JTTFs, the participants at those sites saw themselves as so connected between
the two organizations that they were basically two facets of the same counterterror node.
Some participants plainly stated this by saying “I see no difference between our fusion
center and the JTTF here.”
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Q10.

As called for in the 2012 National Strategy for Information-sharing, are

federal agencies “sharing the right information with the right people at the right time” in
your view? For example, do you receive information about terrorist threats in general or
actionable intelligence on specific individuals or cases?
There were a wide variances of perspectives from participants in answering this
question with some replying they felt they do get what they need in a timely manner and
most commenting they do not get specific or actionable intelligence. Some representative
participant responses include “The answer is generally yes. It's not at the right time
sometimes or delays and sometimes we find out after the fact about a terrorism related
investigation” as well as “I think it feels more general and I think specific stuff more
probably ends up going to a JTTF to investigate and carry out.”
Subsequent analysis of these replies using NVivo 11 revealed that the differences
in perspective on this question have to do with the type of fusion center (analytical vs
investigative) as well as the role the participant plays in the fusion center (leader vs nonleader). This will be addressed in more detail below in comparative responses by type
center and leader vs non-leader. Additionally, responses to this question will be further
addressed in findings by research question.
Q11.

Other than the obstacles and barriers to federal terrorism information

already described, are there other risks to this information-sharing?
This question most often generated a discussion of the risks to intelligence sharing
such as the potential for information becoming public or “leaking” out. There was also a
wide variance of perspective on answering this question with some feeling there certainly
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are risks to sharing and other feeling the risks are minimal and at times overexaggerated
by those not in a fusion center.
A representative participant responses that risks are minimal was “I think it's
absurd to imply that there is a risk to over sharing and I guess there's crusty agents out
there that will tell you more stories about their case getting blown because it got leaked to
the wrong place but, I haven't seen that happen, I haven't seen a real example of that.”
However, other recognized the risks and one fusion center director stated:
There's obviously risks, risk of compromise, risks of oversharing or risk of ending
up harming investigations, but we are very draconian in our information-sharing
processes, we have to be very deliberate. Unfortunately, there are humans
involved and sometimes people don't understand or don’t follow procedures.
Q12.

What have been the most useful sharing mechanisms from the federal

government for information and intelligence on terrorist threats; systems such as
Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN), FBI Law Enforcement Online (LEO)/FBI
Net, or embedded personnel in your fusion center and interagency liaison meetings?
This question mainly asked the participants to not only describe what they viewed
as the most effective sharing mechanisms overall, but to also compare technological
sharing with interpersonal sharing. 24 out of 25 participants clearly identified people and
interpersonal relationships as by far the most effective sharing mechanism. Most
participants were also very emphatic on this point and made comments including the
following “a hundred percent the people” and “personal relationships” or “People, hands
down” or “physical like having a physical body in the fusion center to me is absolutely
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the best way to get information whether it's coming or going I think it clears up a lot of
miscommunication or inconsistencies” as well as “The most useful sharing mechanism
by far is having people co-located” and “It's really hard to justify the bosses. It's hard to
write it into budgets. But fusion centers downward and fusion centers upward. I think
they live and die on relationships.”
Comparison of Leader Responses to Other Fusion Center Personnel
Participant responses based upon being a leader or non-leadership members of
fusion centers was the first interesting trend discovered during analysis. Fusion center
leaders including upper-level leaders such as directors or deputy directors as well as
supervisors in fusion centers viewed intelligence sharing from the federal government
much more positively than the non-leadership members of the same fusion centers (those
who do the daily work). Fusion center directors often described as a positive development
how often they were being “briefed” about ongoing FBI terrorism investigations in their
jurisdictions. However, non-leadership fusion center personnel such as analysts and
investigators often commented on this did not constitute intelligence sharing in their mind
since the directors left those meetings (or phone calls) with nothing in their hands or
anything they could share with the rest of their fusion center. The fusion center nonleaders had a much less positive view of the state of terrorism intelligence sharing since
they are accessing classified government secure networks with little valuable intelligence
to do their jobs while fusion center directors are “in the know” but can’t share with them
to inform fusion center work. This finding was consistent across all five sites researched
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regardless of the type of fusion center or the size of their jurisdiction, and was a very
interesting discovery not mentioned in any previous research.
Comparison of Responses by Profession: Intelligence vs Law Enforcement
There were few substantive differences between participant responses based upon
only their career field when it came to the core issues of benefits and barriers to sharing
with fusion centers. Both types of professionals shared common views overall of what
was holding up effective sharing and what would improve it. However, there were some
differences when it came to their level of intensity of their beliefs. For example, both law
enforcement professionals and intelligence professionals felt that people were the most
important sharing mechanism with systems being secondary. However, law enforcement
professionals responded immediately and were highly emphatic on this point and left no
doubt as to their views about the supremacy of personal relationship as the most
important aspect of sharing. When intelligence professionals answered the same question
they also came down on the side of people as most effective for sharing, but only after
hesitation or reflection and they seemed to hold this view to a less intense degree than
law enforcement professionals.
For example, law enforcement professionals would answer the question on the
most important sharing mechanism with statements like “hands-down its people” or
“people 100%” while intelligence professionals would answer with a reply along the lines
of “people are most effective, but I still want access to the systems.” These differences
are likely due to the necessity for law enforcement professionals to reply upon people to
succeed in their careers such as the use of witness testimony and confidential informants.
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Intelligence analysts on the other hand predominantly rely on written reports and second
hand sources and methods that are accessible in databases and often remove them for
direct contact with the people gathering this mainly human derived intelligence.
Comparison of Responses by Longevity
Participant responses based upon both longevity in their career field and within
the fusion center provided some interesting patterns regardless of the site researched.
Those individuals with many years of longevity in their career field were more
understanding and realistic about what can really be expected from the type of
information which could or should be shared with fusion centers. Those long serving
professionals and those with the longest service within fusion centers were aware of the
extreme sensitivity of case specific information and a number knew of instances where
investigations had been compromised. Senior law enforcement officers and analysts
stated that this will probably never happen, nor were they interested in investing the time
to try to search those complex systems even if they were allowed access. These veteran
law enforcement officers and senior analysts were generally satisfied with the overall
level intelligence sharing.
However, more junior participants and those with less career experience were less
understanding and more expectant of what can or should be shared with them as far as
specificity and actionable intelligence. These less experienced individuals felt the
strongest that intelligence of a specific and actionable nature was not being shared with
their fusion center. State and local junior intelligence analysts were also the individuals
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most eager to have access to FBI case files and sensitive databases on individuals under
investigation.
Additionally, those with longevity in fusion centers greater than 3 years had
interesting perspectives based upon experiences with different federal agency personally
being assigned to their fusion center and evolving relationships between their fusion
center and JTTFs. These long serving professionals emphasized trust building between
individuals from other agencies (particularly with the FBI) and they saw FBI
representatives to their fusion center come and go. These professionals were very
thankful for the near daily interactions with DHS representative and critical of the fact
that FBI personal were only “part time” in the fusion center (on average 2 days a week
across all fusion centers visited). The strong view of the participants in this research is
that periodic participation is very inadequate and state and local participants expressed
the desire to have both DHS and FBI representatives in their fusion centers on a daily
basis.
Comparison of Responses by Type of Fusion Center
While there is no standard fusion center, there were two common counterterrorism roles for each fusion center researched for this study. These include receiving
and vetting suspicious activity reports from both public and official sources, as well as
the function of dissemination terrorism warning information to those who need –
primarily patrol officers. Beyond those two functions there was significant variance in the
fusion center roles relating to domestic terrorism. Fusion centers focus on analysis of
trends and disseminating as much unclassified information as possible. Other fusion
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centers have taken on a significant out-reach and training role focusing on getting the
word out to both law enforcement agencies as well as the private sector on how to best
report on and prepare for terrorist activity.
Separate from these analytical and dissemination driven centers, some fusion
centers researched are also investigative in nature or contain an operational component
with a terrorism related mission. These fusion centers with an ‘on the ground’ role to play
in terrorism had a very close and symbiotic relationship with the JTTF (and to a lesser
degree with DHS operational agencies such as CBP and the Coast Guard). Additionally,
the intelligence needs of centers with an investigatory or operational role are different
than ones that are purely analytical or have a watch function. Analytical centers mainly
received general information on terrorism from the federal government, such as how
recent attacks in the U.S. and Europe were undertaken. Investigative and operational
centers receive more specific intelligence on individual cases within their jurisdiction. It
is likely this difference is due to the need to synchronize investigations and de-conflict
potential operations.
At the outset of this research I envisioned there would be differences in the
perspectives between state fusion center and those for major urban areas. However, in the
context of sharing of federal intelligence on terrorism there was no discernable
divergence based upon level of government. In fact, there were also no notable
differences in federal intelligence sharing between large state and small states, so there
were no findings based solely upon the size of a jurisdiction for a fusion center. However,
there were differences based upon the different fusion center missions and exact role each
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plays in countering terrorism with regard to federal sharing with them. For example,
fusion centers that generally focus only on analysis and providing products to their
stakeholders most often only reported getting general terrorism information from the
federal government. However, fusion centers with an investigative role or an operational
component with a terrorism related mission reported receiving actionable intelligence on
specific cases and specific individuals of terrorist interest very often.
Validity, Credibility, and Confirmability
This study strived for validity, credibility, and confirmability of the research by
employing objective techniques to ensure integrity and scholarly quality. These strategies
included variation in research site selection, consistent participant selection based upon
background, reflexivity, and dissertation committee review (Anney, 2014). Research sites
were selected to include large and small states and local fusion centers to match the
national proportions. Participants were specifically recruited based upon backgrounds
that were followed consistently at each site researched. For example, variation was
employed by ensuring that interviewees came from varying positions within fusion
centers, and at each center the same type of background was recruited. Additionally,
exactly five individuals were interviewed at each site for consistency. Reflexivity was
also employed by using a field journal and notes for critical self-reflection (Ortlipp,
2008). Confirmability and dependability were ensured by specifying these procedures,
the sample population, and site selection criteria all explained in detail so another
researcher can duplicate this study and get same results.
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Findings and Enumeration
This section of Chapter 4 presents some of the main findings from researching
intelligence sharing at these fusion centers. The answers from the participants clearly
demonstrated the Dawes (1996) theory of interagency information-sharing provided an
effective framework to analyze the obstacles and opportunities of federal terrorism
intelligence sharing with nonfederal fusion centers. The participant answers outlined both
benefits and barriers of federal terrorism information-sharing with fusion centers.
These findings focus on the 3 research questions this study employed revolving
around the Dawes (1996) framework of interagency information-sharing. For the
purposes of data coding and analysis the 12 interview questions were individually
subordinated to the most relevant research question. This facilitated focusing the research
around the Dawes model as shown in Table 4 below.
Table 4
Interview questions subordination to research questions
RQ1: How effectively are fusion centers receiving terrorism intelligence from federal
agencies?
1.

What role does your fusion center play in counterterrorism?

6.
Which federal intelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies share info and
intel on terrorism with your fusion center?
10.
Are federal agencies “sharing the right information with the right people at the
right time”? Do you receive general threat information or actionable intelligence on
specific individuals or cases?
12.
What have been the most useful sharing mechanisms from the federal government
on terrorist threats.
RQ2: Opportunities of federal intelligence sharing with fusion centers
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2.
How has receiving federal information and intelligence in your fusion center been
useful in countering terrorism?
3.
What are the opportunities or benefits of federal Counter Terrorism (CT)
info/intel sharing with fusion centers?
8.
How would fusion centers be different if they had extensive access and sharing of
federal CT info/intel?
9.
Should federal security agencies share info/intel with fusion centers or should
they share with a different organization in your jurisdiction (such as a JTTF)?

RQ3: The main obstacles to intelligence sharing with fusion centers
4.
What are the obstacles or barriers of federal CT info/intel sharing with fusion
centers?
5.
What can or should be done to remove or mitigate these obstacles, barriers, and
risks that impede effective sharing of federal terrorism information and intelligence
sharing with state and local fusion centers?
7.

How would fusion centers be different if there was no sharing of federal CT intel?

11.

Are there other risks to this information-sharing?

Research Question 1: How effectively are fusion centers receiving terrorism
intelligence from federal agencies?
The first research question this study sought to answer was: how effectively are
fusion centers fulfilling their intended purpose to improve homeland security by
receiving terrorism information and intelligence from federal agencies? As mentioned
above this research question was pre-coded in NVivo by grouping the nodes of all
participant responses to questions 1, 6, 10 and 12. Codes that emerged from analysis
included effectiveness, limited sharing and means of sharing.
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The answer to this research question is that fusion centers can be effective sharing
mechanisms, as demonstrated in the interviews of 25 participants from five east coast
fusion centers, but the level of effectiveness depends on at least two factors. These factors
are the mission of each fusion center and the organizational and personal relationships
between federal agencies and key officials within the jurisdiction.
When it comes to the mission and role of a fusion center there was a distinct
difference between the perspectives of the effectiveness of sharing from federal agencies
based upon what that fusion center actually does as it related to counterterrorism. As
discussed in Chapter 2 there are a number of fusion centers varieties such as those which
are investigatory, analytical, and those with a watch function. The responses in this study
showed if the fusion center has only an analytical role then the respective perceptions of
intelligence sharing by those in that center were noticeably lower than those of fusion
centers with a counterterrorism operational component or investigative role. Participants
in analytical only fusion centers rarely mentioned receiving actionable intelligence or
specific case information. This makes sense as why would an analytical only center need
actionable intelligence or case specific information if they have no action to take or
investigation to deconflict?
So the effectiveness of fusion centers in receiving intelligence varies depending
on the role and mission of the fusion center. Therefore the intelligence needs of each
center in terms of specificity and timeliness vary accordingly. When developing
assessments for federal intelligence sharing with state and local fusion centers these
different missions and roles need to be factored in.
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Organizational and personal relationships between the fusion center and key
federal agencies was just as important, although much less tangible. It is very difficult to
measure personal relationships, but as many participants emphasized, it can be the most
important factor in how much or what kind of intelligence is shared with a fusion center.
The organizational and personal relationships with federal agencies and officials within
the jurisdiction is a very multifaceted factor since it includes many different components
such as the personal relationships between the fusion center director and senior FBI
officials in the city or state, the level of trust fusion center personnel have with their
embedded federal representatives from DHS and the FBI, as well as the quality of state
and local liaisons or embeds in federal agencies such as JTTFs.
These personal relationships are extremely hard to get right and even harder to
measure, especially for the entire national network of fusion centers. Additionally,
personal relationship are also very perishable and even good relationships may vanish
when a new fusion center director or FBI SAC is assigned. But that does not mean it
should be left off fusion center assessments as it currently is.
Research Question 2: What are the opportunities or benefits of federal CT info/intel
sharing with fusion centers?
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this research question was pre-coded in
NVivo by grouping the nodes from participant responses to questions 2, 3, 8 and 9. Two
primary codes that emerged during analysis on opportunities or benefits of sharing
intelligence with fusion centers included preventing terrorist attacks and being able to
disseminate to state and local user such as police and other first responders. Additional
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codes that emerged included having access to more intelligence sources and the ability
for state and local analysts to have context for national and international events as well as
terrorist trends and patterns.
The predominant benefits to sharing federal terrorism intelligence with fusion
centers immediately mentioned by participants is the ability to fuse federal intelligence
with state and local knowledge to stop terrorist attacks. If state and local officials are
aware of the specific intelligence available to federal agencies they can be on the lookout
for known individuals or search the state and local records based on this information.
This was witnessed by the researcher during a visit to a state fusion center during an east
coast wide manhunt for terrorist suspect Ahmad Khan Rahami who had just allegedly
bombed multiple cities in NY and NJ wounding over 30 people and was still at-large
(U.S. Attorney’s Office Southern NY, 2016). Federal authorities shared what they knew
about Rahami with fusion centers as well as an associated license plate. Fusion center
officials in the state fusion center being visited immediately sent this information out to
all state police on patrol (and local agencies) and programmed it into the automatic
license plate readers on patrol cars and other locations in the state. Terrorist suspect
Ahmad Rahami was apprehended while the researcher was still on-site at the fusion
center. However, if Rahami was driving and had passed a license plate reader, it would
have immediately shown the benefit of federal intelligence sharing with the national
network of fusion centers.
In the context of Dawes (1996) model, the main benefits and opportunities are
also just as heavily focused on the organizational and political components as were the
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obstacles, and less on the third factor of technology. These research findings clearly
deemphasized technical barriers in interviews with participants. However, there was an
emphatic request for more embedded federal representatives and changes to policies and
procedures when it comes to sharing (which are both organizational and political). The
participants mentioned many benefits that fit the Dawes (1996) theoretical framework
such as fostering program and service coordination.
These findings also show that while there is room for improvement on the
technology side, the focus is on what can be gained through more extensive in-person
contacts. Participants emphasized that agency personnel across all three levels of
government to exchange information to better secure the American people in a
collaborative manner. This falls exactly into the premise of improved and integrated
government services through interagency information-sharing described by Dawes
(1996).
Research Question 3: What are the obstacles or barriers of federal CT info/intel
sharing with fusion centers?
This final research question was pre-coded in NVivo by grouping the nodes of all
participant responses to questions 4, 5, 7 and eleven. During analysis emerging codes
included classification, interpersonal, organizational, and policies and procedures. There
was also a code created for facilities, but this was a relatively minor barrier mentioned
compared to the other four codes that emerged.
There were four major thrusts that participants outlined when it comes to
identifying the most significant barriers to effective intelligence sharing from federal
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agencies down to fusion centers. These four obstacles can be listed plainly as clearance,
culture, policy and personality, or C2P2. The ‘clearance’ obstacles addresses all the
issues surrounding the sharing restrictions and excuses about sensitive sources and
methods and ongoing investigations that keeps intelligence from being shared. This “need
to know” mentality was a contributing factor in 9/11 and other terrorists attacks like Fort
Hood and the Boston marathon bombing.
The culture aspect focuses on organizational perspective of entities like the FBI
where the long standing views of sharing it that it happens “to” the FBI but little comes
“from” them to partners. This organizational culture is improving according to
participants, but is still a significant barrier from the state and local perspective. This is
closely linked to the ‘policy’ barrier where having a ‘duty to share’ has still not been
manifested into organizational policies and procedures to enable highly effective
terrorism sharing (not just after a case is closed). Multiple participants mentioned pre9/11 policies of information-sharing restrictions and lack of access to reports and data
continue to hinder effecting collaboration between federal agencies and state and local
fusion centers.
The final main barrier revolves around the personality of individuals involved in
sharing federal information both within and adjacent to fusion centers. The major players
for fusion centers are the FBI Special Agents in Charge (SACs) of FBI field offices and
JTTF supervisory agents in their jurisdictions. These FBI officials hold significant sway
over what will be shared with fusion centers and they set the atmosphere for both the FBI
personnel and interagency detailees working under their organizations.

130
Numerous participants mentioned significant sharing differences (both positive
and negative) based solely upon a change in the FBI SAC in their jurisdiction. This also
highlights the great importance of the personal relationships between these SACs and
fusion center directors. Every upper-level fusion center leader interviewed placed
significant emphasis on their personal interactions with the FBI SAC as well as the
frequency and depth of sharing. However, personality is also the most intangible aspect
of sharing and the most difficult to overcome if key leader personalities are not in-sync
between these agencies. Table 5 below lists these obstacles, a brief description, and
representative participant responses.
Table 5
Obstacles to federal intelligence sharing with fusion centers
Title

Obstacle or Barrier description

Representative participant quote

Clearance

Fusion centers are at the Secret
level only and many stakeholders
and ‘customers’ have no clearance

“There's information on the federal
level that's classified, it cannot be
shared down”

Culture

Federal intelligence agency
cultures do not emphasize sharing

“Institutional culture sucks…trying to
get information from my federal
partners is like pulling teeth”

Policy

Policies still emphasize “need to
know” not a “duty to share”

“…if it goes to the JTTF we may
never hear about it…we are not
getting all the information”

Personality

What to share and how much to
share with fusion centers is highly
reliant on interpersonal
relationships, especially with the
FBI

“…it still tends to be personality
dependent, so if the FBI SAC is
supportive of the role of fusion
centers then you have a pretty good
relationship”
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In the context of Dawes (1996) model, these barriers and obstacles are focused
heavily on the organizational and political components, and less on the third factor of
technology. This is an interesting finding since the emphasis in the literature and federal
statutes surrounding sharing with fusion centers only focuses the technical aspects, as if
incompatible technologies are the problem. However, the real barriers to sharing shown
from this research are that the organizational and political factors are the real obstacles.
As a case in point, fusion centers have access to the secure communications technology,
but it is the interagency relationships and government policies preventing that technology
from carrying any meaningful and actionable intelligence on them (such as terrorism tear
lines relevant to their jurisdiction).
The research has shown that effective sharing of terrorism intelligence primarily
occurs in these five fusion centers mainly through personal contacts. Further, this
research has identified that the four most significant obstacles or barriers to effective
intelligence sharing with nonfederal fusion centers are clearance, culture, policy and
personality. In the context of Dawes theoretical framework, these four major obstacles all
fall within the factors of organizational or political barriers and none predominantly
technical in nature.
How federal sharing really occurs with fusion centers
The finding of this research is that intelligence sharing is not principally focused
on technology, but is really about people. This is an important finding as the only current
official measures of sharing with state and local officials focus solely on systems to
share. The fusion center baseline capabilities by DOJ and DHS discuss the ability to
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receive federal information solely based on having the computer systems in place within
the fusion center, as well as making sure it is connected to HSIN and HSDN/FBINet. In
plain terms, it asks do you have the computer, it is set up, does it turn on, and does it have
connectivity? The reality is these systems reflect only a minority of intelligence sharing,
and these systems are not considered the most important element according to every
participant in this study save one. The critical operating capabilities do reflect the much
more important question about receiving federal intelligence on terrorism, which is, do
you have representatives from the DHS and FBI embedded in your center on a near daily
basis to share intelligence with you?
These federal officials embedded within a fusion center are the key to federal
intelligence sharing with state and local officials. These individuals know what is going
on with their respective agencies and they know the federal information systems and
exactly how to find what is needed for the fusion center. These federal representatives are
also tied into their home agencies and counterparts within the state and within their
networks to know what is going on (well beyond what is known in a fusion center) and
are able to share what they can with at least the fusion center director.
This research finding that information-sharing is more about personal interactions
than systems is not a new discovery by itself. The point of virtual or telephonic
collaboration being far inferior to personal contact has been empirically demonstrated
many times (Kraut, Fussell, Brennan, & Siegel, 2002). This research established twofold
findings in this regard. The first outcome to emerge is the premise of personal contact is
not just for sales or business, but that it is just as important (or even more so) in the
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context of federal intelligence sharing with fusion centers. The second outcome to
emerge is the finding about the great importance of embedded federal personnel in fusion
centers has not been addressed as the key to effectiveness of this sharing dynamic. In
fact, the DOJ and DHS baseline capabilities and subsequent annual assessments ignore
this point completely when requiring fusion centers have the ability to receive
information from federal partners by only addressing clearances and systems and not
addressing the more essential aspect of embedded federal personnel. Additionally, the
much more recent National Fusion Center Strategy from 2014 also has a focus on
intelligence sharing systems and does not address embedded federal representatives
either.
Summary
The findings in this research shows that fusion centers can contribute to stopping
terrorist attacks if intelligence is effectively shared with them in a timely manner. The
main barriers to effective intelligence sharing according to participants are clearance,
culture, policy and personality. Fusion center leaders think the state of intelligence
sharing is more effective than those doing the work for them in the fusion centers.
Importantly, federal terrorism intelligence sharing with fusion centers is really about
people, not systems or technology. In fact, every participant but one identified personal
interactions as the most effective mechanism for sharing terrorism intelligence with
fusion centers and highlighted their embedded federal representatives.
Chapter 5 offers final insights as well as policy recommendations and potential
topics for future research.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
Since 9/11, every U.S. state except Wyoming, and many major urban areas, have
established fusion centers to promote? information-sharing by bringing together
intelligence from a variety of sources and thus better protecting its citizens from terrorists
and other significant threats. One of the most important sources of intelligence for fusion
centers is the kind of sensitive intelligence on terrorist threats that can come only from
federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Despite this sharing imperative,
research has shown providing terrorism intelligence to fusion centers remains suboptimal. This study sought to find out (a) how effectively federal agencies are sharing
intelligence with fusion centers, (b) the sharing opportunities and obstacles, and (c) the
best practices that might be shared.
Interpretation of Findings
Terrorists are a particularly difficult intelligence target because they organize as
clandestine networks, hide within open societies, act alone or kill without notice (Sims,
2007). For this reason, it is important that agents of the federal government share as much
as possible on terrorists with the affected? jurisdictions and work together to stop them.
By interviewing participants from five East Coast fusion centers, I was able to identify
the benefits and barriers to intelligence sharing as well as answer the research questions
on how effectively these centers are serving their purpose as a hub of terrorism
intelligence sharing.
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The barriers to intelligence sharing identified here, based on Dawes theoretical
framework, are principally organizational and policy in nature; the barriers revolve
around clearance, culture, policy, and personality. The benefits of federal intelligence
sharing with state and local fusion centers is that citizens are better protected and
terrorism is collaboratively countered. Although important and useful, terrorism
intelligence sharing is not principally about access to databases or information
technology. Sharing is primarily about (a) interagency organizational relationships within
a jurisdiction and (b) between key personnel from agencies with a role in
counterterrorism.
A point here can be made about the Boston bombings and information-sharing.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the FBI agent investigating Tamerlan Tsarnaev did not
discuss the assessment with any state or local officials, including those on his squad from
the Boston Police in the JTTF. However, he did file his report in the FBI’s Guardian
system, which members of the JTTF had access to. But this is not sharing because it does
not involve dissemination to those in the JTTF or offer a mechanism to push the
information out to those in the jurisdiction might want to know. Massachusetts
Congressmen William Keating wrote a letter to FBI Director James Comey in in July
2013 about this lack of sharing within the JTTF. He wrote: “these local officials could not
search the database for something they did not know existed” (Keating, 2013, p. 3).
The findings in this study about the critical importance of personal relationships
and embedded personnel to enable interagency intelligence sharing and collaborative
countermeasures makes the Special Operations fusion center more relevant to domestic
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fusion centers than might seem obvious. The JIATF model described in Chapter 2 that
worked so well to defeat al Qaeda in Iraq in the mid to late 2000s is an important case
that offers some considerations and best practices for domestic fusion centers. As General
McChrystal stated,
proximity to Washington also had costs. The Beltway culture compelled, or
allowed, the agencies to be less collaborative. Valuable information that might
slide across a table downrange had to cross miles and clear bureaucratic hurdles
back in the States. In Washington, the myriad essential but competing priorities,
from bureaucracy to family life, always slowed action. For this reason, the JIATF
would bring analysts from each agency into the same literal tent—and that tent
would be on a base in Afghanistan or Iraq. Obviously, this would enable
intelligence to be analyzed downrange, close to the fight, making the process
faster and the information potentially more relevant. Less obvious but more
important, having the analysts live and operate forward, teamed with counterparts
from other agencies, decreased the gravitational pull of their headquarters back in
D.C. and dramatically increased the sense of shared mission and purpose. It was
extraordinarily powerful for analysts to share information, to brief operators on
their assessments, to hear the rotors of an assault force launching on their
information, and then to debrief together after the operation. (McChrystal, 2013)
This sense of shared purpose and mission focus, which I personally experienced
in the JIATF under General McChrystal, I also witnessed in the narratives of the
embedded federal agency representatives from all five fusion centers researched. These

137
individuals are federal employees reporting to supervisors in Washington (or closer by),
but they became full-fledged “teammates” with their fellow fusion center members and
this is mutually beneficial for many reasons. The embedded federal representatives (from
both the FBI and DHS) has not only earned the trust of their state and local partners, but
they fully understood the intelligence needs of the fusion center (and their stakeholders)
in ways that cannot be achieved from the outside. This is how intelligence is really
shared, person to person, and this is not reflected in existing fusion center assessments.
Interagency relationship building is very difficult with conflicting or overlapping
organizational responsibilities and cultures as well as personalities getting in the way. As
General McChrystal (2013) described,
No alliance could be as infuriating or as productive as my relationship with the
CIA... more than once, my most trusted subordinates had to stop me, in moments
of utter frustration, from severing all ties with our ‘Agency brothers,’ repeating
back to me my own guidance to preserve our relationships through specific
conflicts...; ours had to be a unified fight.
In seeking to achieve this unified fight for the homeland, we have to set the
conditions to do so and embed more federal representatives in fusion centers, which will
be a key policy recommendation of this study. This will not be easy, as even General
McChrystal serving as a high ranking commando general officer in Iraq with the
President’s ear and focused on the number one terrorist threat at the time (al Qaeda in
Iraq) he had great difficulty bringing together the necessary interagency intelligence
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players to join his JIATF (Henricksen, 2013). However, this is what is needed to address
the terrorism threat we face today here at home.
Implications for Positive Social Change
Overcoming the barriers to counterterrorism interagency intelligence sharing can
significantly impact major aspects of our society in ensuring a collaborative approach to
counterterrorism. This can only be achieved if it is based on a solid foundation of
terrorism intelligence sharing across all 3 levels of government. By effectively sharing
terrorism intelligence vertically and horizontally among partner agencies is the only way
to stop the complex threats the nation faces from both international terrorists and
homegrown extremists (Schmitt, 2011). We cannot go back to the way it was before 9/11
where a failure to effectively share resulted in a massive tragedy.
A specific example where getting this sharing ‘right’ could have averted disaster
is the case of NY/NJ terrorist suspect Rahami mentioned earlier in this chapter. On the
morning of September 19th 2016 I observed a fusion center in action during an East
Coast wide manhunt for this suspect. That day counterterrorism intelligence from federal
agencies was quickly disseminated out to every state police officer on patrol (and directly
to their cruisers) as well was programmed into license plate readers. One can only
imagine if this network of fusion centers had been in place before 9/11 and federal
agencies had shared what they knew about the al Qaeda hijackers already here in
America months before that fateful day.
This research contributed to the body of knowledge on fusion center with
empirical evidence and original findings on how federal intelligence is actually shared
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with state and local officials, and how it can be improved. If the policies and procedures
are enacted and federal personnel are embedded full-time to enable effective terrorism
intelligence sharing with nonfederal fusion centers, then significant social change can be
gained through increased abilities to counter terrorist attacks within the homeland. This
research intends to positively influence improved national security through policies that
reflect the importance of fusion center federal manning as the crux of intelligence sharing
(over systems) and the need to develop and assess personal relationships between key
individuals and organizations with leading counterterrorism roles in protecting our
citizens.
Recommendations
This research has identified a number of best practices where effective federal
terrorism intelligence sharing was reported by participants. Additionally, some specific
policy recommendations identified through conducting this research that can improve
terrorism intelligence sharing. These best practices along with specific policy
recommendations are addressed below.
Embed more federal representative from DHS and FBI in fusion centers
Participants in the study were highly appreciative of each individual federal
representative embedded in their fusion center and all emphasized how important these
individuals are for effective intelligence sharing. Most participants would rather have
these federal representative in their fusion centers than having information systems
allowing them to access federal intelligence. In fact, these federal personnel themselves
were listed as the most effective sharing mechanism for intelligence on terrorists within
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their jurisdiction. When asked which federal agencies share with their center, some
participants immediately personalized the question and replied by naming the individual
embeds on a first name basis. The participants were also clear that they want more federal
representatives in their center; both more representatives and to have them for more time.
These federal representatives, such as the DHS intelligence officers, also often
have some responsibilities outside the fusion center since they often represent the entire
17 agency consortium of the U.S. Intelligence Community to that state or locality.
Multiple participants complained that when their DHS person was out (for whatever
reason), they felt significantly hampered in their state or local mission. So most fusion
centers would greatly benefit from a having a second full time DHS person embedded in
the form of an intelligence analyst—a more junior person working under the supervision
of the DHS Intelligence Officer or Senior Reports Officer (SRO). This framework offers
more depth in key federal representatives in the fusion centers and allows the DHS
representative to perform outreach or training in the jurisdiction as well as provide total
job coverage (in the event of illness, conference, or vacation, etc).
This same model of a 2 person federal liaison team should be used for the FBI
representation with a full time FBI Special Agent and full time FBI Intelligence Analyst
embedded in each fusion centers. This recommendation would significantly increase
manning as the FBI generally sends only liaisons to fusion centers on a part time and as
an additional or supplementary duty to investigative or analytical work for the local FBI
field office (not full-time embedded). Several participants discussed the different pros
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and cons of having an FBI Agent representing the bureau versus an FBI Intelligence
Analyst, so the optimal solution is to send both according to participants.
In sum, every recognized fusion center should have at least one DHS IO or RO
and at least one full time FBI Intelligence Analyst or Special Agent. None of the 5-fusion
centers researched had an arrangement of this kind. Based upon the fusion centers’
operational capabilities and mission, more of these federal representatives may be
required. At least one fusion center was striving for two full time representatives from
each agency for a total of four. The optimal footprint in a fusion center would be a DHS
Intelligence Officer, a DHS Intelligence Analyst, an FBI Special Agent and an FBI
Intelligence Analysts. This is the best solution to support fusion centers, although this is a
significant federal resource commitment and currently legislatively constrained, at least
for DHS according to participants.
Embed more fusion center personnel in JTTFs
Just as having more federal representative embedded in fusion centers, much can
be gained by having more state and local representatives in JTTFs. Fusion center
directors mentioned being proud of their own personnel detailed to JTTFs in their
jurisdiction, and this is a strong bond for intelligence sharing. However, multiple nonleadership participants working in fusion centers emphasized how these detailed
individuals are not allow to share intelligence about ongoing investigations due to
operational sensitivities (for the most part). It should also be emphasized that overcoming
organizational culture can be eased by sending “the right person” as a fusion center
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representative who can most easily earn the trust of the FBI Agents and other law
enforcement professionals in key positions in the JTTF.
The theme of establishing or building trust was mentioned often by participants in
this study, and some investigators confessed to having bias against analysts (who do not
have a badge or carry a gun). This same bias is famous in the FBI, and a fusion center
director may benefit more in the long run by sending a detective or investigator to be
their representative to a JTTF than even their best intelligence analyst for this reason.
Also, sending a police officer or detective to the JTTF who reports to the fusion center
director and where that relationship is strong will help facilitate the JTTF to fusion center
organizational relationship as well.
Assess the real mechanisms for intelligence sharing: Relationships
The fusion center baseline capabilities only assess systems and not where most
information-sharing really occurs, with embedded personnel (both within the centers and
from the center to critical nodes like JTTFs). Information systems required for sharing
should not be eliminated, but the emphasis for assessing intelligence sharing with fusion
centers should be refocused on people and organizational relationships. There is no
mention in fusion center assessments now of the all-important role of people in sharing,
and this needs to be addressed and made a priority. Not only do fusion centers need
federal embeds from DHS and FBI, they need to be increased in number and they need to
be quality individuals with training and solid relationships back to their home federal
agency. Priority should be placed on who is sent from federal agencies to the fusion
centers, as a number of state and local participants complained about being sent “the JV
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team” to their fusion center where (the FBI in particular) viewed fusion center duty as a
less than desirable assignment.
Focus fusion center directors on relationships
Leading a fusion center is a difficult and complex job requiring the ability to form
a cohesive team from a highly diverse conglomeration of analysts, agents, investigators
and emergency services personnel—many of whom probably do not directly work for
them. Couple this complexity with the necessity to establish and maintain very effective
personal and professional relationships with a constellation of federal (and other)
agencies and you have a glimpse of the day in the life of fusion center director. Fusion
center directors discussed how different this type of assignment is compared to traditional
police work. Directors participating in this study shared how they personally felt
unprepared at the beginning of their assignment to succeed. Some felt that after several
years they had finally figured out their jobs but were only at this point highly effective
and now subject to rotation to a different job.
Two fusion center directors commented without prompting that the process to
select, train, and assign new fusion center directors is less than optimal. Although a law
enforcement professional himself, one fusion center director stated the job is so
specialized and complex that the position should probably be filled by an intelligence
professional. At any rate, when selecting and training fusion center directors, the most
important aspect should be the personality component according to this research. If
people and relationships are the most effective sharing mechanisms, then directors should
be selected based on their leadership and interpersonal skills. Fusion center directors
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should primarily focus on team building within the fusion center and relationships
building with the many federal partners and other stakeholders in the jurisdiction.
A recommendation for fusion center personnel is to deliberately plan unofficial
and social interactions both internally and with the key external partners. These
interactions will do more to establish personal bonds and build trust more than work
interactions and meetings. I would suggest fusion center directors prioritize getting out of
the center frequently for personal and focused engagements to build and sustain critical
relationships supporting the fusion center mission. Within the fusion center they could
plan team-building events like team sports, going to the shooting range together, and
occasional outings like a fusion center barbeque. These activities may sound trivial, but
as multiple participants pointed out, it is too late to start a relationship or begin to build
trust once a crisis occurs.
Employ open collaborative work environments
In order to actually fuse diverse agencies and different types of information it
requires a collaborative working environment within a fusion center. If analysts and
agents have to navigate a labyrinth of cubicles or are constantly going up and down stairs,
that serves as a physical barrier to effective sharing and collaboration. Also, people can't
collaborate well if they are stuck behind a vault all day while analysts and investigators
toil away in an unclassified pen, or worse, their individual cubicle. Some fusion centers
are set up well and others were hampered by their physical environments. If domestic
counterterrorism is important to a jurisdiction then I recommend establishing more open
architecture work spaces to enable this collaboration. Since personal relationships as so
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important to sharing, there should also be multiple social spaces like a well-stocked and
aesthetic break room, an outdoor patio or gazebo to allow critical social bonds to build.
Improve tailoring intelligence for state and local partners
Another recommendation is that federal intelligence can be better tailored to the
requirements of state and local partners. Multiple participants complained about the vast
amounts of unhelpful information available to them in the classified and unclassified
federal systems. Most fusion center participants rarely access these systems to do their
jobs and some purposely avoid it. There is very little in there that pertains to their
jurisdiction. Intelligence needs to be pushed to those who need it, not just searchable as
few know what may or may not be in there relating to them. It is not just a duty to share,
but a question we often asked ourselves in the military: who else needs to know this?
When appropriate and valuable to a jurisdiction, federal agencies should push intelligence
to the fusion center.
As an example, participants mentioned that NCTC Current (a federal terrorism
database) is now available on HSDN at the Secret level, but they said very little useful
intelligence is accessible in that system. The vast majority of federal terrorism
intelligence is maintained at the top secret level and not available to fusion centers. While
participants do not accuse anyone of purposely withholding intelligence from fusion
centers, there also does not seem to be a significant effort to downgrade this vast
intelligence to the Secret level for dissemination to state and local partners either. An
aspect of this recommendation is to aggressively push down to state and local fusion
centers what they need to know using a secret level ‘tear-line’ report.
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Mandate intelligence sharing on terrorism to state and local fusion centers
A final recommendation to overcome sub-optimal federal intelligence sharing
with nonfederal fusion centers is to direct that this intelligence be shared. Mandating
federal agencies share intelligence on terrorist threats may be the only way to overcome
many of the barriers like personal relationships and organizational culture. Requiring that
intelligence be shared with fusion centers is like psychologists having a duty to report
patients to law enforcement who are a threat to themselves or others. Having Congress
pass a law that mandates intelligence on terrorism be disseminated to nonfederal fusion
centers would move the nation literally toward a “a duty to share” paradigm.
Recommendations for Future Research
This study was conducted as an exploratory case study “aimed at generating
hypotheses for later investigation” (Baškarada, 2014, p. 5). One proposition of this study
is that personal interactions are the most important sharing mechanism, as evidenced by
participant interviews. This was a new finding and one that calls for further research as
no other study has identified this as the primary factor with intelligence sharing and
fusion centers.
Additional findings from this study can be further researched based on differing
locations and research methodologies. Replicating this study using the same
methodologies and research questions in a different region of the country can further
confirm the findings or adjust them based on other locational factors. This concept could
entail repeating the qualitative case study approach by conducting interviews in other
regions of the country such as the west coast, gulf coast, or middle America. For
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example, the fusion center in Chicago was not researched or visited (as it is not on the
East Coast). However, it was mentioned by a participant as a positive example where a
fusion center is housed in a secure federal facility and can access Top Secret and
compartmented government intelligence. By studying other regions of the country further
research may reveal other unknown factors or different interactions of factors that cannot
be known until studied.
Another way to expand upon this research is to employ additional research
approaches. A second potential future study concept could include conducting this same
study quantitatively across the entire country using surveys. Several existing research
studies on fusion centers used this quantitative approach, but none of them focused
specifically on intelligence sharing from federal agencies down to the state and local
officials. Creating a quantitative research instrument based upon the interview questions
from this research study but employed across the nation could generate some interesting
findings. If significantly more time and resources were applied, a mixed methods
approach may also reap new or interesting findings that expand on this qualitative
exploratory case study.
However, repeating this study across the country solely by using quantitative
surveys could be much less effective than approaches which also employ in person
interviews. There were many perspectives shared that interviewees would not have been
as likely to write down on a survey and send in. Also, several participants were recruited
based on establishing a level of trust with them that is not possible with mass distribution
of impersonal surveys. For example, gaining entrance to fusion centers for this research
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was done by first establishing rapport and some degree of trust with each fusion center
director. Then, every individual interviewed for the study knew my intelligence
background as well as my employment teaching Homeland Security college courses. This
greatly assisted in gaining entrance and recruiting individuals to participate. Those
interviewees then advocated participation in the study to other members of their fusion
center or their own personal network of contacts at other fusion centers. Once done with
their own interview, completed participants then recommended to onsite coworkers and
off-site contacts in other fusion centers to allow me to interview them. The rapport
establishment and trust building with interviewees was passed on to others and following
fusion centers which generated momentum. It is unlikely that an impersonal survey can
establish even this surface level of trust or elicit perspectives on a sensitive topic like
terrorism intelligence sharing.
Another consideration for future research could include focusing on the
organizational relationships within fusion centers and between fusion centers and other
organizations. As this study highlighted in Figure 2 Sharing With and Within a fusion
center, there are many different types and directions (both internally and externally)
where sharing occurs related to fusion centers. While this study only focused on the
vertical and singular direction of federal intelligence sharing with fusion centers, it would
be interesting to learn from an in-depth study trying to map out in detail the sharing that
was depicted in figure 2 both within a fusion center (or centers) and between fusion
centers and the many key other organizations they interact with on the outside.
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Another new and interesting line of research related to this study could include
adjusting the same research questions that focused on fusion centers to instead address
the role of JTTFs in terrorism intelligence sharing. FBI JTTFs were not directly studied
as a part of this research, but their role and the importance of the relationship between
fusion centers and JTTF became very evident. JTTFs primarily serve as interagency
counterterrorism investigative bodies, but they also are advanced as a mechanism to share
terrorism information and intelligence. For this possible future study, it would make
sense to start with another exploratory qualitative case study of JTTFs on the east coast,
including those who’s jurisdiction is an entire state and those focused on a single urban
region.
Implications for Positive Social Change
Overcoming the barriers to counterterrorism interagency intelligence sharing can
significantly impact major aspects of our society in ensuring a collaborative approach to
counterterrorism. This can only be achieved if it is based on a solid foundation of
terrorism intelligence sharing across all 3 levels of government. By effectively sharing
terrorism intelligence vertically and horizontally among partner agencies is the only way
to stop the complex threats the nation faces from both international terrorists and
homegrown extremists. We cannot go back to the way it was before 9/11 where a failure
to effectively share resulted in a massive tragedy.
This study contributed to the body of knowledge on fusion center with significant
and original findings on how federal intelligence is actually shared with state and local
officials, and how it can be improved. If the policies and procedures are put into

150
enactment and federal personnel are embedded full-time to enable effective terrorism
intelligence sharing with nonfederal fusion centers, then significant social change can be
gained through increased abilities to counter terrorist attacks within the homeland. This
research intends to positively influence improved national security through policies that
reflect the importance of fusion center federal manning as the crux of intelligence sharing
(over systems) and the need to develop and assess personal relationships between key
individuals and organizations with leading counterterrorism roles in protecting our
citizens.
Summary
This exploratory case study into terrorism intelligence sharing with nonfederal
fusion centers has identified several tangible barriers preventing effective sharing such as
clearance, culture, policy and personality. The study also detailed of many of the benefits
to our nation in better protecting citizens that can be gained in overcoming these
obstacles. Changing policies to enable sharing and emphasizing the importance of
personal contacts and embedded federal personnel (over systems) is an important finding
that should become reflected in both state and local programs as well as federal fusion
center funding and statutes.
Finally, this was an academic study and the researcher is aware that many of these
policy recommendations may be resource intensive or difficult to enact. However, is it
important to reflect on these recommendations now and not after the next major terrorist
attack with hundreds of American killed in another preventable catastrophe that could
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have been stopped if federal agencies had only been more effective at fulfilling its duty to
share the intelligence in its possession with state and local partners.
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Appendix A: Background Questions and Interview Questions

Participant Background Questions:
1. What is your profession / career field (Law enforcement, intelligence, etc)?
2. How many years have you worked in this career field?
1-3; 4– 5; 6 – 8; 9 – 12; 13 – 16; 17 – 21; 20+
3. What is your position within the fusion center?
4. How many years have you worked at this particular fusion center?
Less than 1; 1 – 3; 4 – 6; 6 – 11; 12+
5. Are you in a leadership/supervisory position within the fusion center?
(If “Yes”) Upper-Level (Director, Deputy Dir); Middle-Level (Lieutenant, etc);
Lower-Level (Senior Analyst, Detective, etc)
6. What level of government does your agency fall under? (federal, state, local)

Interview Questions
1. The January 2015 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report found that over
96% of fusion centers have involvement in counterterrorism in their mission focus.
What role does your fusion center play in counterterrorism?
2. How has receiving federal information and intelligence in your fusion center been
useful in countering terrorism?
3. What are the opportunities or benefits of federal Counter Terrorism (CT) info/intel
sharing with fusion centers?
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4. What are the obstacles or barriers of federal CT info/intel sharing with fusion centers?
5. What can or should be done to remove or mitigate these obstacles, barriers, and risks
that impede effective sharing of federal terrorism information and intelligence sharing
with state and local fusion centers?
6. Which federal intelligence, security, and law enforcement agencies share info and
intel on terrorism with your fusion center?
7. How would fusion centers be different if there was no sharing of federal CT
info/intel?
8. How would fusion centers be different if they had extensive access and sharing of
federal CT info/intel? (examples include access to FBI case files of ongoing terrorism
investigations in your area, current intelligence agency threat streams, and warning of
suspected terrorism related travel in your area, foreign fighters returning from
overseas conflict zones, radicalized citizens)
9. Should federal security agencies share info/intel with fusion centers or should they
share with a different organization in your jurisdiction (such as a JTTF)?
10. As called for in the 2012 National Strategy for Information-sharing, are federal
agencies “sharing the right information with the right people at the right time” in your
view? For example, do you receive information about terrorist threats in general or
actionable intelligence on specific individuals or cases?
11. Other than the obstacles and barriers to federal terrorism information already
described, are there other risks to this information-sharing?
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12. What have been the most useful sharing mechanisms from the federal government for
information and intelligence on terrorist threats; those described in the DOJ/DHS
baseline capabilities assessment such as Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN),
Homeland Security Information Network Intelligence Community of Interest (HSINIntel), FBI Law Enforcement Online (LEO)/FBI Net, or other mechanisms to receive
terrorism info and intel in your fusion center such as liaison meetings, videoconferences, periodic visits, telephone calls, etc.
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Appendix B: Participant Backgrounds By Site and Totals

